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THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF “GOD”:
USING THE LANGUAGE OF THE
FRAMING GENERATION TO CREATE
A COHERENT ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
MICHAEL I. MEYERSON*
The Supreme Court’s attempt to create a standard for evaluating whether the
Establishment Clause is violated by religious governmental speech, such as the
public display of the Ten Commandments or the Pledge of Allegiance, is a total
failure. The Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been termed
“convoluted,” “a muddled mess,” and “a polite lie.” Unwilling to either allow all
governmental religious speech or ban it entirely, the Court is in need of a
coherent standard for distinguishing the permissible from the unconstitutional.
Thus far, no Justice has offered such a standard.
A careful reading of the history of the framing period reveals that those
responsible for the initial implementation of the First Amendment were able to
create a compromise that permitted the use of governmental religious speech in a
way that was inclusive of all citizens, regardless of faith. Committed to creating
an “American” vision of religious freedom, one that was distinct from the
restrictive practices of the individual states, George Washington, Thomas
Jefferson, and James Madison created a new template for public religious
vocabulary. Through the use of non-sectarian, theologically equivocal language,
they found a way to talk simultaneously to the most orthodox segment of the
population and atheists, deists, and other members of religious minorities.
My Article proposes building on the lessons of the framing period to create a
workable Establishment Clause jurisprudence. If we accept that non-sectarian
phrases such as “endowed by their Creator” need not divide our nation, we can
modify the traditional “endorsement test.” A workable test reflecting the
Framers’ wisdom would only judge governmental speech as unconstitutional if it
endorsed religion in such a way “that it sends a message to nonadherents that
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of
the political community.” Simple non-sectarian utterances, such as the Supreme
Court’s invocation “God save the United States and this honorable court,” would
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be permitted, while the courthouse display of the Ten Commandments would be
prohibited, and judges and lawyers would finally be able to rely on a usable,
understandable Establishment Clause jurisprudence.

I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 1037
II. RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE ................................................ 1041
A. “God save the United States and this honorable Court” ....... 1041
B. The National Motto ................................................................... 1043
C. The Pledge of Allegiance .......................................................... 1045
D. Legislative Prayer ...................................................................... 1048
III. THE COURT’S CONFUSION ............................................................... 1051
A. A Judicial Hodgepodge ............................................................ 1053
1. Legislative Purpose of Advancing Religion.................. 1056
2. Endorsement Test ............................................................ 1056
3. Ceremonial Deism ........................................................... 1057
4. Acknowledgment of the Nation’s Religious
Heritage ......................................................................... 1058
5. Sectarian Endorsement ................................................... 1060
6. Coercion ......................................................................... 1061
7. Avoiding Divisiveness ..................................................... 1061
B. Seven Flawed Standards ........................................................... 1062
IV. HOW THE FRAMERS SPOKE ABOUT RELIGION ............................. 1071
A. Never a Christian Nation .......................................................... 1071
B. George Washington and the Tax to Support Christian
Teachers .................................................................................... 1077
C. Defining “God” ......................................................................... 1082
D. The Religious Language of Jefferson and Madison .............. 1088
E. The Failed Sectarian President ................................................. 1092
V. LEARNING FROM THE FRAMERS ..................................................... 1094
A. Speaking to All Americans ....................................................... 1094
B. Establishing the Framers’ Compromise .................................. 1096
VI. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................... 1100

2015]

THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF “GOD”

I.

1037

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court has never figured out how to evaluate the
constitutionality of the myriad religious references that pervade
American public life. The Court seemingly alternates between ad hoc,
one-case-at-a-time jurisprudence and prudential avoidance of the
constitutional issue altogether. The result has been confusion for
government officials, a lack of guidance for lower courts, and
unsympathetic disrespect by many of those who study the Court.1
The fundamental problem for the Court arises from the fact that it
has been unwilling to either prohibit all governmental religious speech
(such as the national motto, “In God we trust,” and the phrase, “one
nation under God,” in the Pledge of Allegiance) or permit all
governmental religious speech (such as placing the Ten Commandments
in a school or courthouse). Thus, the Court is left with the difficult task
of articulating the line between permissible and unconstitutional
religious governmental speech. As Douglas Laycock noted,
It is easy to explain why government can never say anything
about religion, and equally easy (though less convincing) to
explain why government can say anything it wants about religion
so long as it does not coerce or penalize those who disagree.
Avoiding either extreme requires the Court to pick and choose,
to explain why government can endorse some religious

1. See, e.g., G. Sidney Buchanan, Prayer in Governmental Institutions: The Who, the
What, and the at Which Level, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 299, 326 (2001) (“[A] healthy dose of
gastronomical jurisprudence enters the arena. We know in our guts that the Supreme Court
will not require government to remove the references to God from the national motto or the
pledge of allegiance. But, we stumble uncertainly in searching for a convincing rationale to
support that position.”); RonNell Andersen Jones, Pick Your Poison: Private Speech,
Government Speech, and the Special Problem of Religious Displays, 2010 BYU L. REV. 2045,
2046 (“All told, the Supreme Court’s handling of purportedly sectarian displays has been
convoluted at best.”); Bruce Ledewitz, Could Government Speech Endorsing a Higher Law
Resolve the Establishment Clause Crisis?, 41 ST. MARY’S L.J. 41, 47 (2009) (“Public religious
displays and imagery are routinely upheld by the courts, but without convincing
explanation.”); Steven D. Smith, Separation and the “Secular”: Reconstructing the
Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REV. 955, 1003 (1989) (“When the Court wishes to
invalidate a law or practice, it implicitly adopts an exclusionary approach; finding religious
content or inspiration, the Court pronounces the law or practice unconstitutional. When the
Court wishes to uphold a law or practice, it adopts an inclusive or positive conception of the
secular; almost any measure enacted by a state or national legislature will survive that test.”).
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propositions but not others, with no clear principle to guide the
choices.2
One of the major reasons the Court has not had a “clear principle”
to guide its Establishment Clause cases is that the Justices have
fundamentally misunderstood the history of the words and actions of
those who helped create the First Amendment. The Framers are
assumed to have wanted either a “‘high and impregnable’ wall between
church and state”3 or a nation in which the national government could
encourage citizens to attend a particular church as long as no
governmental coercion was involved.4 The Framers are said to have
been interested in furthering either only monotheism5 or only
Christianity.6
The error in these interpretations is that they treat the Framers as
simplistic, narrow-minded partisans. In reality, the Framers constructed
a sophisticated compromise. They recognized the important distinction
between governmental action and governmental speech. The federal
government was considered virtually prohibited from regulating or
funding religious activities.7
But genuine, devout governmental
religious speech was to be permitted, within carefully delimited bounds.
The Framers found language that expressed reverential concepts
without implying that those not of a favored religion were second-class
citizens.8 They avoided sectarian references, but they were not afraid of

2. Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Comment: Theology
Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but
Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 223–24 (2004).
3. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947)).
4. “The Framers understood an establishment ‘necessarily [to] involve actual legal
coercion.’” Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 693 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (alteration
in original) (quoting Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 52 (2004) (Thomas,
J., concurring in the judgment)).
5. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 893 n.3 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
6. Id. at 880 (majority opinion).
7. In 1811, for example, James Madison vetoed a law that would have granted “five
acres of land, including Salem Meeting-house, in the Mississippi Territory, for the use of the
Baptist Church.” 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 1097–98, 1104 (1811). The Baptist church had
requested the land because, after erecting the church building, it discovered that the structure
was on federal property. Unable to obtain clear title to the property, the church petitioned
Congress. Madison’s veto message declared that this grant would violate the Establishment
Clause by setting a “precedent, for the appropriation of funds of the United States, for the
use and support of religious societies.” Id. at 1097–98.
8. See infra Part V.A.
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the public offering of truly religious expression. They strove to create a
civil vocabulary that could encompass all people, regardless of their
faith.
Their means for accomplishing this difficult feat was the deliberate
use of theologically equivocal language. The best-known example is the
Declaration of Independence’s use of “endowed by their Creator,”
which can be seen by the devout as pious religious language but can be
heard by non-believers in a variety of other ways. By contrast, the
Framers avoided sectarian language, as well as governmental directives
that the citizenry pray. Following the path of the Framers, we can
create a twenty-first century standard for evaluating which religious
governmental speech is consistent with the Establishment Clause.
It is important to emphasize that emulating the Framers in this area
does not require commitment to the “originalist” school of
constitutional interpretation.9
One need not believe that, when
interpreting the Constitution, “we must be guided by [its] original
meaning, . . . [that what] . . . it meant when adopted, it means now.”10 It
is possible to agree that both Bolling v. Sharpe11 and United States v.
Virginia12 were correctly decided, notwithstanding the certainty that the
Framers of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments did not intend their
amendments to provide equality for African-Americans and women.
One can also agree that, “[d]espite more than forty years of criticism
by the historical academy, ‘bad history’ abounds in Religion Clause
jurisprudence.”13 Far too many judicial and scholarly opinions that
purport to rely on the founding period are in reality nothing more than
“‘law office’ history,” that is, “the selection of data favorable to the
9. Originalism “most often refers to the normative constitutional interpretive theory
that instructs judges faced with indeterminate textual guidance to look primarily to the
original understanding of a particular clause’s ratifying generation.” Jamal Greene, Selling
Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 662 (2009); see also Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A
Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 377 (2013) (“[O]riginalism argues that the
discoverable public meaning of the Constitution at the time of its initial adoption should be
regarded as authoritative for purposes of later constitutional interpretation.”).
10. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 359 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (quoting South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448
(1905)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
11. 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (banning racial segregation in schools under federal
jurisdiction).
12. 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (requiring that women be admitted to the Virginia Military
Institute).
13. Steven K. Green, “Bad History”: The Lure of History in Establishment Clause
Adjudication, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1717, 1719 (2006) (footnote omitted).
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position being advanced without regard to or concern for contradictory
data or proper evaluation of the relevance of the data proffered.”14
We can also accept the observation that, even if the study of history
is honestly pursued and well-researched, it cannot be expected to
“provide specific answers to modern controversies.”15 History can,
however, “provide the perimeters within which the choice of meaning
may be made.”16 It can “inform; it cannot resolve legal controversies.”17
In the area of freedom of religion, in particular, the practices of the
founding generation can “shine light upon the meaning of the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.”18 Founders such as George
Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison thought deeply
about the meaning of liberty of conscience and also about the painful
history of governmental involvement with religion. Unlike their
antiquated views on issues like race and gender, the Framers had a
sophisticated understanding of religious freedom that is surprisingly
modern. They knew that religion could be a source of both incredible
good or incredible evil, and they were committed to finding ways in
which religion could unite, rather than divide, the new nation. We need
not follow the Framers in this area because we want to “return to the
days” of the founding period.19 Rather, we should learn from their
experience to ensure that the Establishment Clause protects their hardwon vision of an American theory of freedom of religion.
This Article is organized as follows. Part II explores the historical
origins of some of the most iconic examples of governmental religious

14. Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119,
122 n.13; see also JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & EDWARD MCGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR., RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM: HISTORY, CASES, AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE INTERACTION OF RELIGION
AND GOVERNMENT 787 n.3 (2d ed. 2001) (“[T]here is a tendency to refer the reader to pages
in the cited volume that appear to bolster the Court’s conclusion, and to ignore other
materials in the same volume that cast doubt on the Court’s reading of the past.”); Jack N.
Rakove, Fidelity Through History (Or to It), 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1587, 1591 (1997) (“We
can think of the role that appeals to history play in the composition of judicial opinions not as
the reasons driving decisions, but as an attractive rhetorical method of reassuring citizens that
courts are acting consistently with deeply held values.”).
15. Green, supra note 13, at 1719.
16. Philip B. Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution, 27 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 839, 841–42 (1986).
17. Green, supra note 13, at 1719.
18. Mark David Hall, Jeffersonian Walls and Madisonian Lines: The Supreme Court’s
Use of History in Religion Clause Cases, 85 OR. L. REV. 563, 567 (2006).
19. Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2155 (1996).
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expression. Part III discusses the hopelessly confused state of modern
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Part IV examines the historical
record and demonstrates the Framers’ sophisticated compromise. Part
V explores how a modern standard can be derived from the lessons of
our founding period.
II. RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE
For a nation without established religion, there exists a seemingly
endless array of religious governmental pronouncements.20 On both the
national and local level, through statutes, proclamations, and informal
practices, religion plays a major role in how government communicates
with the citizenry. Any attempt to create a workable jurisprudence for
evaluating these statements and activities must begin by recognizing the
many different ways that America’s governments utilize religious
utterances.
A. “God save the United States and this honorable Court”
At the time the Constitution was ratified, the state courts of New
England generally opened with a sectarian prayer offered by local
clergy.21 The original Supreme Court Justices “rode the circuits” and
heard cases throughout the new nation.22 When sitting in New England,
the Justices followed the local custom of beginning court sessions with a
prayer. John Jay, the first Chief Justice, wrote of his plans for sitting in
the “Northern Circuit”: “It appears to me adviseable to respect ancient
usages in all Cases where Deviations from them are not of essential
Importance. . . .
The custom in New England of a clergyman’s

20. See, e.g., LEONARD LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT, at xiv (2d ed. rev. 1994) (“[R]eligion saturates American public life.”);
Ashley M. Bell, Comment, “God Save This Honorable Court”: How Current Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence Can Be Reconciled with the Secularization of Historical Religious
Expressions, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1273, 1276 (2001) (“Historical religious expressions are
deeply embedded in various aspects of public life.”).
21. See, e.g., Charles F. Sedgwick, Fifty Years at the Litchfield County Bar (1870), in
DWIGHT C. KILBOURN, THE BENCH AND BAR OF LITCHFIELD COUNTY, CONNECTICUT
1709–1909, at 75 (1909) (“It had been the practice of the Congregational pastor of the village,
to open the proceedings in Court with prayer . . . .”).
22. “The Judiciary Act of 1789 . . . required Justices to ride circuit, which involved
traveling from state to state in order to hold circuit court in each district within a circuit twice
annually.” David R. Stras, Why Supreme Court Justices Should Ride Circuit Again, 91 MINN.
L. REV. 1710, 1715 (2007).
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attending, should in my opinion be observed and continued.”23 A
Boston newspaper noted that the Circuit Court for the District of
Massachusetts
opened on Saturday, May 12, [1792,] with Chief Justice John Jay,
Associate Justice William Cushing, and Judge John Lowell in
attendance. On Monday, May 14, Jay delivered a charge to the
grand jury . . . ‘replete with his usual perspicuity and elegance.’
The prayer was made by the Rev. Dr. [Samuel] PARKER.”24
Similarly, a New Hampshire newspaper reported:
On Monday last the Circuit Court of the United States was
opened in this town. . . . After the Jury were empannelled, the
Judge delivered a most elegant and appropriate Charge. . . .
Religion & Morality were pleasingly inculcated and enforced, as
being necessary to good government, good order and good laws,
for “when the righteous are in authority, the people rejoice.”
....
After the Charge was delivered, the Rev. Mr. [Timothy]
ALDEN addressed the Throne of Grace, in an excellent, well
adapted prayer.25
Thus, not only was there a well-established practice of many state
courts beginning their sessions with sectarian prayer, that practice was
initially copied by Supreme Court Justices riding circuit. What is so
significant, though, is that the practice of sectarian prayer in federal
court was obviously and unambiguously rejected by Chief Justice John
Marshall. Virtually nothing is known about when or why Marshall
began opening Supreme Court sessions with the cry, “God save the

23. Letter from John Jay, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, to Richard
Law, District Judge, United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Mar. 10,
1790), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1789–1800, at 13, 13 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1988) [hereinafter 2 DHSC].
24. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts (May 12, 1792), in 2 DHSC, supra
note 23, at 276, 276 (quoting COLUMBIAN CENTINEL, May 16, 1792, at 74).
25. UNITED STATES ORACLE, May 24, 1800, reprinted in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, at 436, 436 (Maeva
Marcus ed., 1990). The quote “when the righteous are in authority, the people rejoice” is
from Proverbs 29:2 (King James). See also COLUMBIAN CENTINEL, June 8, 1793, reprinted in
2 DHSC, supra note 23, at 406, 406 (“Judge WILSON delivered to the Grand Jury, a Charge,
replete with the purest principles of our equal Government, and highly indicative of his legal
reputation. After the Charge, the Rev. Dr. THACHER addressed the throne of Grace, in
prayer.”).
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United States and this honorable Court.” The earliest report is from a
book written in 1857, about a hearing the author had attended in 1827:
The judges were all seated, and the marshal, in a kind of nasal
tone, cried out, “Yea, yea, yea, yea! the Supreme Court of the
United States is now in session. All persons having business
before the court will be heard. God save the United States and
this honorable court.” The court was opened. Chief Justice
Marshal was seated in the middle, on his right were Justices
Story, Thompson and Duval; on his left, Washington, Johnson
and Trimble.26
There is no reported statement of Chief Justice Marshall as to why
he initiated the practice of a brief, non-sectarian invocation instead of a
sectarian prayer, but that decision certainly seems to argue against using
the invocation in support of sectarian governmental prayer and
displays.27
B. The National Motto
Prior to 1956, the United States lacked a national motto. It had been
popularly assumed that “E Pluribus Unum—Out of many, One,” which
has appeared on the Great Seal of the United States since 1782, was the
national motto,28 but its status had never been made official.
Meanwhile, on September 21, 1814, Francis Scott Key’s song, “The Star
Spangled Banner,” declared in its fourth verse: “And this be our
motto—‘In God is our Trust.’”29 During the Civil War, on December 9,
26. OLIVER HAMPTON SMITH, EARLY INDIANA TRIALS AND SKETCHES 137
(Cincinnati, Moore, Wilstach, Keys & Co. 1858).
27. For example, Justice Scalia has argued in favor of governmental displays of the Ten
Commandments by stating, “The Supreme Court under John Marshall opened its sessions
with the prayer, ‘God save the United States and this Honorable Court.’” McCreary Cnty. v.
ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 886 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE
SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 469 (rev. ed. 1926)). Similarly, Justice
Stewart defended the practice of sectarian public school prayers by noting, “At the opening of
each day’s Session of this Court we stand, while one of our officials invokes the protection of
God. Since the days of John Marshall our Crier has said, ‘God save the United States and
this Honorable Court.’” Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 446 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(quoting 1 WARREN, supra, at 469).
28. 1 BENSON J. LOSSING, HARPERS’ POPULAR CYCLOPÆDIA OF UNITED STATES
HISTORY FROM THE ABORIGINAL PERIOD: CONTAINING BRIEF SKETCHES OF IMPORTANT
EVENTS AND CONSPICUOUS ACTORS 1264 (New York, Harper & Bros. Publ’g 1892).
29. See generally OSCAR GEORGE THEODORE SONNECK, REPORT ON “THE STARSPANGLED BANNER” “HAIL COLUMBIA” “AMERICA” “YANKEE DOODLE” 7, 37 (1909).
His song was originally published in the Baltimore American. Id. at 7. It became the official
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1863, Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase ordered the Director
of the Mint, James Pollock, to place “In God We Trust,” on coins.30
Congress then authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to place a
phrase on coins31 but did not specify the particular phrase until 1873.32
The authorization became a requirement in 1908, when Congress
mandated that the specific phrase continue to appear on coins.33 The
requirement was extended to all currency in 1955.34
The following year, Congress voted to make the phrase, “In God We
Trust” the national motto. Citing both the National Anthem and the
inscription on currency, the House Report declared that “it is clear that
‘In God We Trust’ has a strong claim as our national motto.”35 The
House Report deemed “In God We Trust” to be “superior” to “E
Pluribus Unum,” concluding that “[i]t will be of great spiritual and
psychological value to our country to have a clearly designated national
motto of inspirational quality in plain, popularly accepted English.”36
On July 30, 1956, President Eisenhower signed the law making “In God
we trust” our national motto.37

national anthem in 1931. Act of Mar. 3, 1931, ch. 436, 46 Stat. 1508 (codified at 36 U.S.C.
§ 301 (2012)).
30. DAVID K. WATSON, HISTORY OF AMERICAN COINAGE 214–15 (New York &
London, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1899). Earlier, Chase had written Pollock: “No nation can be
strong except in the strength of God, or safe except in His defense. The trust of our people in
God should be declared on our national coins.” Id. at 214.
31. Act of Apr. 22, 1864, ch. 66, 13 Stat. 54.
32. The Coinage Act of 1873, ch. 131, § 18, 17 Stat. 424, 427 (“[T]he director of the mint,
with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, may cause the motto ‘In God we trust’ to
be inscribed upon such coins as shall admit of such motto; and any one of the foregoing
inscriptions may be on the rim of the gold and silver coins.”).
33. Act of May 18, 1908, ch. 173, § 1, Pub. L. No. 60-120, 35 Stat. 164.
34. Act of July 11, 1955, ch. 303, Pub. L. No. 84-140, 69 Stat. 290. The current
requirement is located in two different sections: 31 U.S.C. § 5112(d)(1) (2012) (“United States
coins shall have the inscription ‘In God We Trust.’”) and 31 U.S.C. § 5114(b) (2012) (“United
States currency has the inscription ‘In God We Trust’ in a place the Secretary decides is
appropriate.”). See generally J. Clifford Wallace, The Framers’ Establishment Clause: How
High the Wall?, 2001 BYU L. REV. 755.
35. H.R. REP. NO. 84-1959, at 1–2 (1956), reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3720, 3720–21.
36. Id.; see B. Jessie Hill, Of Christmas Trees and Corpus Christi: Ceremonial Deism and
Change in Meaning Over Time, 59 DUKE L.J. 705, 708–09 (2010) (“[I]t was not until much
later, in a frenzy of religious piety mixed with patriotism not unlike that accompanying the
motto’s initial appearance in the Civil War era, that ‘In God We Trust’ was finally adopted as
the national motto.”).
37. Act of July 30, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-851, 70 Stat. 732 (codified as amended at 36
U.S.C. § 302 (2012)).
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C. The Pledge of Allegiance
The Pledge of Allegiance, without any reference to God, was written
in 1892, by a Baptist minister’s son, Francis Bellamy, as part of a
planned celebration of the 400th anniversary of Christopher Columbus’s
landing in the New World.38 Printed in a very popular publication,
Youth’s Companion, the Pledge read, “I pledge allegiance to my flag
and the Republic for which it stands—one Nation indivisible—with
liberty and justice for all.”39 In the 1920s, the National Flag Conference
changed the phrase “my flag” to “the flag of the United States of
America,” so that immigrant children would be taught that it was the
American flag to which they were pledging allegiance.40
During the 1930s, many states and local governments mandated the
recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools.41 In 1940, the
U.S. Supreme Court, in Minersville School District v. Gobitis,42 upheld
the expulsion from public school of two Jehovah’s Witnesses, who saw
the Pledge as a violation of their religious beliefs.43 The Court termed
the compulsory Pledge a permissible “means to evoke that unifying
sentiment without which there can ultimately be no liberties, civil or
religious” and a “universal gesture of respect for the symbol of our
national life.”44
Two years later, in 1942, Congress enacted the first federal law
recognizing the Pledge of Allegiance and also described the proper way
for both civilians and the military to stand while reciting the Pledge.45
38. Jeffrey Owen Jones, The Pledge’s Creator, SMITHSONIAN, Nov. 2003, at 113, 114.
39. Id. at 115 (emphasis omitted).
40. This change happened in two intervals. In 1923, the National Flag Conference
changed the language to “the flag of the United States,” and the next year added, “of
America.” Id. at 115.
41. See, e.g., Hering v. State Bd. of Educ., 189 A. 629, 629 (N.J. 1937) (“[E]very board of
education in this state is obliged to procure a United States flag for each school in the district;
the flag is to be displayed upon or near the public school building during school
hours[,] . . . and the pupils are required to salute the flag and repeat the oath of allegiance
every school day.” (citing Act of May 2, 1932, ch. 145, sec. 1, § 230, 1932 N.J. Laws 260)); see
also Leoles v. Landers, 192 S.E. 218, 221 (Ga. 1937) (describing a city board of education
requirement that all public school students “must ‘salute the flag of the United States’”).
42. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
43. Id. at 591, 597–98.
44. Id. at 597.
45. Act of June 22, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-623, § 7, 56 Stat. 377, 380. According to the
law, the Pledge would be
rendered by standing with the right hand over the heart; extending the right hand,
palm upward, toward the flag at the words ‘to the flag’ and holding this position
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Ironically, the next year, the Supreme Court reversed itself and, in West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,46 overruled Gobitis and
said that the compulsory nature of the Pledge violated the First
Amendment.47 Significantly, the Court did not base its decision on
religion; the Pledge at the time contained no religious language.
Moreover, the Court said the fact that the students’ objections to
reciting the pledge were based on their religion was not determinative.48
Rather, the constitutional flaw was that the government was “invad[ing]
the sphere of intellect and spirit” by mandating that a private
individual’s speech be in conformity with a governmental edict:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an
exception, they do not now occur to us.49
Thus, Barnette is properly seen as a speech case, not a religious case.
After that decision, local governments continued to require that public
school teachers lead their students in the Pledge but provided that
students who objected would be permitted to refrain from reciting the
Pledge.50
In 1954, Congress altered the text of the Pledge to add the words
“under God.”51 A major goal of the sponsor of the bill was to
differentiate the United States from its Cold War adversary, the Soviet

until the end, when the hand drops to the side. However, civilians will always show
full respect to the flag when the pledge is given by merely standing at attention, men
removing the headdress. Persons in uniform shall render the military salute.
Id.
46. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
47. Id. at 642.
48. Id. at 634–35.
49. Id. at 642.
50. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 8 (2004) (“Consistent
with our case law, the School District permits students who object on religious grounds to
abstain from the recitation.”); Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437, 443 (7th
Cir. 1992) (describing the testimony of the superintendent of schools in Wheeling, Illinois,
that no student “is compelled to recite the Pledge, to place his hand over his heart, to stand,
or to leave the room while others recite”).
51. Act of June 14, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-396, 68 Stat. 249. For an excellent history of
the adding of “under God,” to the Pledge, see Epstein, supra note 19, at 2118–22.
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Union.52 Others emphasized the benefits of having America’s children
reassert a belief in God.53 The final version of the bill provided the
version of the Pledge that has remained unchanged since: “I pledge
allegiance to the flag of the United States of America and to the
Republic for which it stands, one Nation under God, indivisible, with
liberty and justice for all.”54
The recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools was
challenged in 2004 in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow,55 on
the grounds that the addition of “under God” constituted an
impermissible establishment of religion.56 The Supreme Court avoided
reaching the merits of the question and ruled that the parent bringing
the suit lacked standing.57 Several Justices, however, filed concurring
opinions, each declaring that the public school’s recitation of the Pledge
did not offend the Establishment Clause.58

52. 100 CONG. REC. 1700 (1954) (statement of Rep. Rabaut) (“[T]he fundamental issue
which is the unbridgeable gap between America and Communist Russia is a belief in
Almighty God.”).
53. “What better training for our youngsters could there be than to have them, each
time they pledge allegiance to Old Glory, reassert their belief, like that of their fathers and
their fathers before them, in the all-present, all-knowing, all-seeing, all-powerful Creator.”
100 CONG. REC. 5915 (1954) (statement of Sen. Wiley).
54. 68 Stat. 249 (codified as amended at 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2012)) .
55. 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
56. Id. at 5.
57. Id. at 17 (“In our view, it is improper for the federal courts to entertain a claim by a
plaintiff whose standing to sue is founded on family law rights that are in dispute when
prosecution of the lawsuit may have an adverse effect on the person who is the source of the
plaintiff’s claimed standing.”), abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
58. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, “I do not believe that the phrase ‘under God’ in the
Pledge converts its recital into a ‘religious exercise’ . . . . Instead, it is a declaration of belief in
allegiance and loyalty to the United States flag and the Republic that it represents.” Id. at 31
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment). Justice O’Connor wrote that the phrase,
although spoken “in the language of religious belief,” is “more properly understood as
employing the idiom for essentially secular purposes.” Id. at 35 (O’Connor, J., concurring in
the judgment). Justice Thomas stated that “[t]hrough the Pledge policy, the State has not
created or maintained any religious establishment, and neither has it granted government
authority to an existing religion.” Id. at 54 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). See also
Myers v. Loudoun County Public Schools, 418 F.3d 395, 406 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[N]ot one
Justice has ever suggested that the Pledge is unconstitutional. In an area of law sometimes
marked by befuddlement and lack of agreement, such unanimity is striking.” (emphasis
omitted)).
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D. Legislative Prayer
The practice of legislative chaplains predates the American
Revolution. On September 6, 1774, the day after the colonial
representatives assembled as the First Continental Congress, a motion
was made to begin each session with a prayer.59 Some members argued
against the motion, expressing concern that, in such a setting, prayer
“would be considered as Enthusiasm & Cant” and cited “the Hazard of
submitting such a Task to the Judgement of any Clergy.”60 The
majority, though, believed in “the propriety of a Reverence &
Submission to the Supreme Being & supplicating his Blessing on every
Undertaking.”61
Concern was also expressed about the difficulty in selecting a
clergyman who could speak to the religiously diverse Congress; some
worried that “we were so divided in religious Sentiments, some
Episcopalians, some Quakers, some Aanabaptists, some Presbyterians
and some Congregationalists, . . . that We could not join in the same Act
of Worship.”62 As a gesture of good will, Sam Adams, a Massachusetts
Congregationalist,63 proposed that the prayer be led by a representative
of the religion that predominated in the southern colonies: “As many of
our warmest Friends are Members of the Church of England, [I] thought
it prudent, as well on that as on some other Accounts to move that the
Service should be performed by a Clergyman of that Denomination.”64
The cleric who presided over the First Continental Congress was
Reverend Jacob Duché.65

59. According to John Adams, Thomas Cushing of Massachusetts made the initial
motion that daily sessions open with prayer. Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams
(Sept. 16, 1774), in 1 ADAMS FAMILY CORRESPONDENCE 156, 156 (L.H. Butterfield ed.,
1963); MICHAEL I. MEYERSON, ENDOWED BY OUR CREATOR: THE BIRTH OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM IN AMERICA 44, 48 (2012). Another delegate, Abraham Clark from New Jersey,
also claims to have made the motion. See Letter from Abraham Clark to James Caldwell
(Aug. 2, 1776), in 4 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 605, 605 (Paul H.
Smith ed., 1979).
60. James Duane’s Notes of Debates (Sept. 6, 1774), in 1 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO
CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 30, 31 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1976) [hereinafter 1 LDC].
61. Id.
62. Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams, supra note 59, at 156.
63. JOHN C. MILLER, SAM ADAMS: PIONEER IN PROPAGANDA 84 (1936).
64. Letter from Samuel Adams to Joseph Warren (Sept. 9, 1774), in 1 LDC, supra note
60, at 55, 55 (emphasis omitted).
65. Letter from Abraham Clark to James Caldwell, supra note 59, at 605.
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In contrast, the Constitutional Convention did not begin its session
with prayer. On June 28, 1787, with the Convention deadlocked over
whether small and large states should have the same voting power,
Benjamin Franklin urged the delegates to follow the example of the
Continental Congress.66 He proposed, “henceforth prayers, imploring
the assistance of Heaven, and its blessing on our deliberations, be held
in this assembly every morning before we proceed to business; and that
one or more of the clergy of this city be requested to officiate in that
service.”67
Franklin’s proposal was defeated.68 There were rumors that
Alexander Hamilton had opposed the call for prayer because “he did
not see the necessity of calling in foreign aid.”69 James Madison
attributed the convention refusal to vote for Franklin’s motion to both
“[t]he Quaker usage, never discontinued in the State & the place where
the Convention held its sittings,” as well as “the discord of religious
opinions within the Convention.”70 According to a postscript Franklin
later added to the paper containing his proposal, “The convention,
except three or four persons, thought prayers unnecessary.”71
After the Constitution was ratified, though, prayer returned to the
national legislative chambers. On April 7, 1789, the second day of its
existence, the U.S. Senate voted to create a committee to meet with the

66. See Benjamin Franklin, Speech to the Federal Convention (June 28, 1787), in 1 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 450, 450–451 (Max Farrand ed., rev.
ed. 1937) [hereinafter FARRAND]. According to Franklin, “In the beginning of the Contest
with G. Britain, when we were sensible of danger we had daily prayer in this room for the
divine protection.—Our prayers, Sir, were heard, and they were graciously answered.” Id.
67. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, Dr. Franklin’s Motion for Prayers in the Convention, in
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN & WILLIAM TEMPLE FRANKLIN, MEMOIRS OF THE LIFE AND
WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 389 (London, 1818).
68. See id.
69. Letter from William Steele to Jonathan D. Steele, in 3 FARRAND, supra note 66, at
467, 472–73 (emphasis omitted). The story probably first appeared in 1825, in a letter from
William Steele to his son, Jonathan D. Steele, purporting to be an anecdote told to the father
by Jonathan Dayton, a delegate from New Jersey. Id. at 467. According to Madison’s notes,
Hamilton expressed concern that beginning prayers more than a month after deliberations
had begun would “lead the public to believe that the embarrassments and dissensions within
the convention, had suggested this measure.” 1 JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 182 (Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., 1920).
70. Letter from James Madison to Thomas S. Grimke (Jan. 6, 1834), in 3 FARRAND,
supra note 66, at 531, 531. Madison also pointed to “the lapse of time which had preceded”
Franklin’s motion. Id.
71. FRANKLIN, supra note 67, at 389 (emphasis omitted).
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House of Representatives to decide how the two bodies would appoint
chaplains.72 In less than a week, the joint committee, one that included
James Madison,73 issued a proposal designed to deal with America’s
religious diversity by ensuring that different denominations be
represented and that neither house would be dominated by a single
denomination.74 This proposal, which was quickly adopted by both
houses, required
[t]hat two Chaplains, of different denominations, be appointed to
Congress for the present session; the Senate to appoint one, and
give notice thereof to the House of Representatives, who shall
thereupon appoint the other—which Chaplains shall commence
their services in the Houses that appoint them, but shall
interchange weekly.75
Later in life, Madison wrote that the payment of governmental funds
for legislative chaplains was a “deviation” from the principle of
“immunity of Religion from civil jurisdiction.”76 He said that he
objected to providing for religious worship “approved by the majority,
and conducted by Ministers of religion paid by the entire nation.”77
But Madison knew that Congress was unlikely to abolish legislative
chaplaincies. Rather than be seen as precedent for governmental
funding of religion, these expenditures, Madison said, should be viewed
as simply insignificant violations of constitutional principles: “As the
precedent is not likely to be rescinded,” he wrote, “the best that can now
be done, may be to apply to the [Constitution] the maxim of the law, de
minimis non curat.”78

72. Journal of the First Session of the Senate of the United States, in 1 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3, 12
(Linda Grant De Pauw ed., 1972).
73. Journal of the First Session of the House of Representatives of the United States, in 3
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 3, 17 (Linda Grant De Pauw ed., 1977).
74. Id. at 25.
75. Id. at 25–26.
76. Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in 9 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 98, 100 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
77. James Madison, Detatched Memoranda, in Elizabeth Fleet, Madison’s “Detached
Memoranda,” 3 WM. & MARY Q. 534, 558 (1946) [hereinafter Madison, Detatched
Memoranda].
78. Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston, supra note 76, at 100 (emphasis
added).
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Since that time, legislative chaplains have been utilized at both the
national and local level. In 1983, the Supreme Court upheld Nebraska’s
practice of paying a chaplain to open legislative sessions with prayer,
even though “a clergyman of only one denomination—Presbyterian—
[had] been selected for 16 years.”79 The Court reasoned that, “[i]n light
of the unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200 years, there
can be no doubt that the practice of opening legislative sessions with
prayer has become part of the fabric of our society.”80
III. THE COURT’S CONFUSION
There is widespread agreement that the Supreme Court has not been
able to create and maintain a consistent and coherent system for
analyzing Establishment Clause issues, such as those arising from the
above-discussed governmental practices. The Court’s Establishment
Clause jurisprudence has been termed in “chaos,”81 “confused,”82 and “a
hopeless muddle.”83
While much of this criticism is valid, the surprising truth is that in
many narrow areas the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is quite settled. This does not mean that there is universal
79. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792–94 (1983).
80. Id. at 792. The Supreme Court extended its rationale in Marsh to permit sectarian
prayer at local town meetings, even when those meetings “involve participation by ordinary
citizens.” Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1842 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
81. John M. Bickers, Of Non-Horses, Quantum Mechanics, and the Establishment
Clause, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 371, 405 (2009).
82. Douglas G. Smith, The Establishment Clause: Corollary of Eighteenth-Century
Corporate Law?, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 239, 294 (2003).
83. Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court’s Four Establishment Clauses, 8 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 725, 728 (2006); see also Daniel O. Conkle, The Establishment Clause and
Religious Expression in Governmental Settings: Four Variables in Search of a Standard, 110
W. VA. L. REV. 315, 315 (2007) (terming the Court’s Establishment Clause doctrine “a
muddled mess”); William P. Marshall, “We Know It When We See It”: The Supreme Court and
Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 495 (1986) (stating that “it has been painfully clear
that logical consistency and establishment clause jurisprudence were to have little in
common”); Jay A. Sekulow & Francis J. Manion, The Supreme Court and the Ten
Commandments: Compounding the Establishment Clause Confusion, 14 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 33, 33 (2005) (describing “the fog obscuring” the Court’s “Establishment Clause
jurisprudence generally”); Mark Strasser, Establishing the Pledge: On Coercion, Endorsement,
and the Marsh Wild Card, 40 IND. L. REV. 529, 530 (2007) (“The only matters about which
one can be confident are that the Justices will be divided, the opinion will be rancorous, and
years of litigation will be required to help clarify the Court’s evolving jurisprudence in this
area.”); Roxanne L. Houtman, Note, ACLU v. McCreary County: Rebuilding the Wall
Between Church and State, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 395, 397 (2005) (stating that “the Supreme
Court’s Establishment Clause [doctrine] . . . has become increasingly ambiguous”).
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agreement with the way the Court has resolved these issues, merely that
the Court has created a recognizable and workable standard that is used
in a generally consistent and predictable manner to resolve particular
questions.84
For example, the use of government funding by religious schools and
religious institutions has been the source of frequent litigation.85
Nonetheless, the Court finally agreed that, as long as the funding criteria
were neutral, government funds could be spent by private citizens on
religious activities:
[W]here a government aid program is neutral with respect to
religion, and provides assistance directly to a broad class of
citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to religious schools
wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent private
choice, the program is not readily subject to challenge under the
Establishment Clause.86
Similarly, the Court has reached a general equilibrium when dealing
with cases involving prayer in public schools.87 Government officials are
barred from encouraging the delivery of, or participation in, prayer
during classes or at “important school events.”88
A different, but equally straight-forward, rule is applied by the Court
when analyzing the use of public property by private religious groups.89
Here, the Establishment Clause is not violated as long as that use is
according to criteria that are neutral as to religion, is “not sponsored by
the school, and . . . [the] forum [is] available to other organizations.”90
84. Cf. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 766 (1979) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (describing a case as one for which “it is more important that it be decided . . .
than that it be decided correctly”).
85. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530
U.S. 793 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388
(1983); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S.
664 (1970); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
86. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652.
87. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577 (1992); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38 (1985); Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
88. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 317.
89. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); see also
Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1811 (2010) (federal statute transferring ownership of cross
and the tiny parcel of government land on which it stands to a private party).
90. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 113.
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Even the seemingly intractable question of what sorts of exceptions
from legal requirements can government permissible carve out for
religious groups has been largely resolved by the Court.91
Accommodations do not violate the Establishment Clause as long as
they alleviate “exceptional government-created burdens on private
religious exercise[,] . . . take adequate account of the burdens a
requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries[,] and [are]
. . . administered neutrally among different faiths.”92
Taken as a group, the rules governing these four areas are
understandable, usable, and consistent with one another. If they
represented the full extent of Establishment Clause questions, there
would be little cause to argue that the Court’s jurisprudence was
incoherent. But when we consider the cases involving governmental
religious expression, the true cause of the problem emerges. It is
primarily these cases that have led to “an Establishment Clause
jurisprudence rife with confusion.”93
A. A Judicial Hodgepodge
If we define the fundamental first-year law student skill of case
synthesis as “bringing together two, three, four, or more decided cases
and other legal authorities as support for a single legal idea or
proposition,”94 it quickly becomes apparent that even the most
rudimentary form of case synthesis in the area of governmental religious
expression is impossible.95 Unfortunately, as one scholar wrote, the
most accurate prediction we can make based on all the relevant cases is
91. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch.
Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994); Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989); Estate
of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982);
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977); Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New
York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313–14 (1952).
92. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720 (citation omitted).
93. Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 1999).
94. Paul T. Wangerin, Skills Training in “Legal Analysis”: A Systematic Approach, 40 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 409, 442–43 (1986); see also DEBORAH A. SCHMEDEMANN & CHRISTINA L.
KUNZ, SYNTHESIS: LEGAL READING, REASONING, AND WRITING 41 (2d ed. 2003) (stating
that “the lawyer needs to take account of multiple close cases, ‘fusing’ them into a single rule
or pattern on that topic that then can be applied to the client’s facts”).
95. Students are taught early on that they “must discard a synthesis when it does not
adequately take into account all relevant cases existing at that time, because such a synthesis
would be a deficient articulation of the current status of the law in that jurisdiction.” Jane
Kent Gionfriddo, Thinking Like a Lawyer: The Heuristics of Case Synthesis, 40 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 1, 9 (2007).
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that “the Justices will be divided, the opinion will be rancorous, and
years of litigation will be required to help clarify the Court’s evolving
jurisprudence in this area.”96 The jurisprudential confusion can be seen
by looking at the opinions of the winning side, those supporting the
judgment of the Court, in the most recent cases involving governmental
religious expression.
In 2004, the Court turned aside on procedural grounds a challenge to
the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools; three
Justices wrote expressing their views that the recitation did not violate
the Establishment Clause.97 The next year, in Van Orden v. Perry,98 the
Supreme Court ruled that a monument by the Texas State Capitol
containing the Ten Commandments did not violate the Establishment
Clause; that case saw a four-Justice plurality and three separate
concurring opinions.99 The same day Van Orden was decided, the
Court, in McCreary County v. ACLU,100 declared it unconstitutional for
two Ohio counties to place a plaque of the Ten Commandments in a
courthouse; this time there was a majority opinion and one
concurrence.101 Finally, in 2010, the Court rejected a challenge to a
federal law transferring ownership of a small plot of government land
with a Latin cross on it to a private party; this case saw a three-person
plurality plus three separate concurrences.102 After reading these
opinions, we still, in the words of one frustrated circuit judge, “remain in
Establishment Clause purgatory.”103
In none of these opinions did a single member of the Court rely on
the so-called “Lemon test.” That test, first announced in the 1971 case
Lemon v. Kurtzman,104 presented a three-step analysis for a
96. Strasser, supra note 83, at 530.
97. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2004), abrogated on other
grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
98. 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (plurality opinion).
99. Id. at 679. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the plurality opinion, Justices Scalia and
Thomas signed that opinion and wrote their own concurring opinion, and Justice Breyer
wrote a concurring opinion but did not sign onto the plurality opinion. Id.
100. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
101. Id. at 868–70. Justice Souter wrote the majority opinion; Justice O’Connor signed
that opinion and authored a concurrence. Id. at 848.
102. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010). The plurality was written by Justice
Kennedy, and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito wrote concurring opinions, and Justice Scalia wrote a separate concurring
opinion, which Justice Thomas joined. Id. at 1810.
103. ACLU of Kentucky v. Mercer Cnty., 432 F.3d 624, 636 (6th Cir. 2005).
104. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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governmental action to survive Establishment Clause scrutiny: “First,
the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government
entanglement with religion.’”105
While the Lemon test has been subject to withering attack by many
of the Justices, it has never been overruled.106 In upholding the
constitutionality of the Texas Ten Commandments monument, a fourJustice plurality explicitly rejected the use of the Lemon test in resolving
the case: “Whatever may be the fate of the Lemon test in the larger
scheme of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, we think it not useful in
dealing with the sort of passive monument that Texas has erected on its
Capitol grounds.”107 The fifth Justice voting to uphold the Texas
monument, Justice Breyer, also specifically disclaimed reliance on
Lemon, but without saying the case should be overturned: “While the
Court’s prior tests provide useful guideposts—and might well lead to
105. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13 (citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of
New York, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
106. The most famous disparagement of the Lemon test is Justice Scalia’s comparison of
it to “some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles
abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried.” Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). For a useful
summary of the Court’s ambivalence towards the Lemon test, see Utah Highway Patrol
Association v. American Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the
denial of certiorari):
Some of our cases have simply ignored the Lemon or Lemon/endorsement
formulations. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Good News
Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783
(1983). Other decisions have indicated that the Lemon/endorsement test is useful,
but not binding. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (despite Lemon’s
usefulness, we are “unwillin[g] to be confined to any single test or criterion in this
sensitive area”); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973) (Lemon provides “no
more than helpful signposts”). Most recently, in Van Orden, 545 U.S. 677, a
majority of the Court declined to apply the Lemon/endorsement test in upholding a
Ten Commandments monument located on the grounds of a state capitol. Yet in
another case decided the same day, McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties
Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859–866 (2005), the Court selected the
Lemon/endorsement test with nary a word of explanation and then declared a
display of the Ten Commandments in a courthouse to be unconstitutional.
132 S. Ct. at 14–15 (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (parallel
citations and footnote omitted).
107. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (plurality opinion). Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote the plurality and was joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Id. at
679.
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the same result the Court reaches today, see, e.g., Lemon, . . . —no exact
formula can dictate a resolution to such fact-intensive cases.”108
The majority striking down the Kentucky courthouse display of the
Ten Commandments specifically rejected a call to “abandon Lemon’s
purpose test.”109 Nonetheless, those Justices never explicitly affirmed
the three-part test either, since their analysis ended upon their finding
an impermissible governmental purpose.110
Parsing the numerous opinions from the cases reveals that there
were seven disparate “tests” or “standards” utilized by the various
Justices in the justification of the four Court rulings.111 A review of each
illuminates the tremendous difficulty the Court has faced in trying to
articulate a workable standard.
1. Legislative Purpose of Advancing Religion
The only majority opinion from this group, McCreary County,
determined that the appropriate test for analyzing whether the Ten
Commandments display being challenged was unconstitutional was
whether the counties acted with the purpose of advancing religion:
“When the government acts with the ostensible and predominant
purpose of advancing religion, it violates that central Establishment
Clause value of official religious neutrality . . . .”112 That neutrality
would be violated if the government were to act with the purpose of
favoring “one religion over another, or religion over irreligion.”113
2. Endorsement Test
The McCreary County majority did not specifically rely on the
“endorsement test,” even though that test had been utilized by the
Court in several earlier cases.114 Justice O’Connor, the originator of the
108. Id. at 700 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
109. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 861 (2005).
110. ACLU of Kentucky v. Mercer Cnty., 432 F.3d 624, 635–36 (6th Cir. 2005).
111. Professor Gey counted even more possible standards: “At one point or another in
recent years, one or more of the nine Justices have signed opinions proposing ten different
standards for enforcing the Establishment Clause.” Gey, supra note 83, at 728. The list in the
text is slightly different, focusing solely on the tests that were actually used to reach the
judgment of the Court.
112. McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 860.
113. Id. at 875.
114. In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, the Court stated, “In cases
involving state participation in a religious activity, one of the relevant questions is ‘whether an
objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the
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endorsement test, did rely on that test in her concurrence: “The purpose
behind the counties’ display is relevant because it conveys an
unmistakable message of endorsement to the reasonable observer.”115
According to Justice O’Connor, the test for determining whether
governmental speech violates the Establishment Clause is whether a
government practice, from “the perception of a reasonable, informed
observer,”116 has “the effect of communicating a message of government
endorsement or disapproval of religion.”117
3. Ceremonial Deism
The year before McCreary County, Justice O’Connor had argued
that a public school’s recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, including
the phrase “one Nation under God,” did not violate the Establishment
Clause because it was a form of “ceremonial deism.”118 This was not a
repudiation of her endorsement test since, according to Justice
O’Connor, government references that are categorizable as ceremonial
deism survive that test because they are “being used to acknowledge
statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement of prayer in public schools.’” Santa Fe
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000) (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76
(1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)). Similarly, the Court had stated in County
of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989):
Whether the key word is “endorsement,” “favoritism,” or “promotion,” the essential
principle remains the same. The Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits
government from appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief or
from “making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s standing in
the political community.”
492 U.S. at 593–94 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring)), abrogated by Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014); see also
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56 (“In applying the purpose test, it is appropriate to ask ‘whether
government’s actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion.’” (quoting Lynch, 465
U.S. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring))).
115. McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 883–84 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor
first proposed the “endorsement test” in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691 (1984)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The proper inquiry . . . , I submit, is whether the government
intends to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion.”).
116. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 773 (1995)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
117. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
118. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 37 (2004) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment). For the derivation of the phrase “ceremonial deism,” see infra
notes 173–80 and accompanying text. A majority of the Court declined to review the merits
of the case, finding that the father of the school child lacked standing. Newdow, 542 U.S. at
17–18 (majority opinion), abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
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religion or to solemnize an event rather than to endorse religion in any
way.”119
Nonetheless, because of the detailed framework that Justice
O’Connor provided for determining which governmental speech
qualified as ceremonial deism, it is useful to consider this a distinct
category. To decide if a government practice constitutes ceremonial
deism, Justice O’Connor said that there were four factors to evaluate:
(a) “History and Ubiquity”—A practice is only to be considered as
ceremonial deism if it “has been in place for a significant
portion of the Nation’s history, and when it is observed by
enough persons that it can fairly be called ubiquitous.”120
(b) “Absence of worship or prayer”—Ceremonial deism will not
be found when the government is leading its citizenry in prayer,
which Justice O’Connor defined as any “statement that has as
its purpose placing the speaker or listener in a penitent state of
mind, or that is intended to create a spiritual communion or
invoke divine aid.”121
(c) “Absence of reference to particular religion”—Ceremonial
deism must be non-sectarian and may not “explicitly favor[]
one particular religious belief system over another.”122
(d) “Minimal religious content”—Ceremonial deism may only
contain a very limited, very brief religious reference, what
Justice O’Connor termed a “highly circumscribed reference to
God.”123
4. Acknowledgment of the Nation’s Religious Heritage
In finding that the placement of a monument containing the Ten
Commandments on the grounds of the Texas state capitol did not
violate the Establishment Clause, a four-Justice plurality opinion,
authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, declared that the Constitution did
not disable “the government from in some ways recognizing our
religious heritage.”124
The Rehnquist opinion stated that its
119. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 43 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
120. Id. at 37.
121. Id. at 39–41.
122. Id. at 42.
123. Id. at 42–43.
124. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 684 (2005) (plurality opinion). Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion was joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. This is essentially
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constitutional analysis was “driven both by the nature of the monument
and by our Nation’s history”125 but did not specify which aspects of that
“nature” and “history” were dispositive.126 The opinion did note that
Texas had “treated its Capitol grounds monuments as representing the
several strands in the State’s political and legal history.”127 The
monument, thus, was seen as having a “dual significance,” not only of
obvious religious meaning but of secular meaning as well.128
The opinion seems to imply that it was highly relevant that Texas did
not have a purely religious purpose for maintaining the monument. In
distinguishing the Texas monument from Stone v. Graham,129 the
Kentucky case striking down a statute requiring the posting of the Ten
Commandments in public schoolrooms, the plurality noted that, “[in]
the classroom context, [it] found that the Kentucky statute had an
improper and plainly religious purpose.”130 The opinion added that the
the same rationale used by Chief Justice Rehnquist when he argued that the public school
recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance did not violate the Establishment Clause: “[O]ur
national culture allows public recognition of our Nation’s religious history and character.”
Newdow, 542 U.S. at 30 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment). Interestingly, Justice
O’Connor joined Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Newdow opinion. Id. at 33 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
125. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 686 (plurality opinion).
126. The Van Orden plurality analysis is similar, but not identical, to the analysis the
Court had utilized in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1982), when it upheld the practice of
legislative prayer. In Marsh, the Supreme Court seemed to say that the simple fact that
legislative prayer had been utilized since the time of the framing was sufficient to establish its
constitutionality:
In light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200 years, there
can be no doubt that the practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer has
become part of the fabric of our society. To invoke Divine guidance on a public
body entrusted with making the laws is not, in these circumstances, an
“establishment” of religion or a step toward establishment; it is simply a tolerable
acknowledgement of beliefs widely held among the people of this country.
463 U.S. 783, 792 (1982). The Van Orden plurality did not explicitly state it was using the
same standard as Marsh but did rely on Marsh for the proposition that
[r]ecognition of the role of God in our Nation’s heritage has also been reflected in
our decisions. . . . This recognition has led us to hold that the Establishment Clause
permits a state legislature to open its daily sessions with a prayer by a chaplain paid
by the State. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S., at 792. Such a practice, we thought, was
“deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country.” Id., at 786.
Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 688 (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted).
127. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 691 (plurality opinion).
128. Id. at 692.
129. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
130. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 690 (plurality opinion).
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Stone decision did not imply that its holding would “extend to displays
of the Ten Commandments that lack a ‘plainly religious,’ ‘pre-eminent
purpose.’”131 It would be a mistake, though, to treat this plurality as
actually agreeing with the majority in McCreary County that a
“purpose” of favoring either one religion over another religion, or
religion in general over irreligion, would violate the Establishment
Clause. All four Justices who signed onto the Rehnquist opinion also
signed onto Justice Scalia’s dissent in McCreary County, which rejected
the “purpose” analysis on the ground that “even an exclusive purpose to
foster or assist religious practice is not necessarily invalidating.”132
5. Sectarian Endorsement
In his concurrence to the Texas monument case, Justice Scalia
seemed to be proposing an Endorsement Clause test that would permit
government to endorse religion in general but not necessarily a
particular religious doctrine. The test he proposed was: “[T]here is
nothing unconstitutional in a State’s favoring religion generally,
honoring God through public prayer and acknowledgment, or, in a
nonproselytizing manner, venerating the Ten Commandments.”133 Even
though his short Van Orden concurrence did not explicitly state that
governmental sectarian endorsement would be unconstitutional, Justice
Scalia made that distinction in his dissent in Lee v. Weisman,134 in which
he stated that
our constitutional tradition . . . ruled out of order governmentsponsored endorsement of religion . . . where the endorsement is
sectarian, in the sense of specifying details upon which men and
women who believe in a benevolent, omnipotent Creator and
Ruler of the world are known to differ (for example, the divinity
of Christ).135

131. Id. at 691 n.11 (quoting Stone, 449 U.S. at 41).
132. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 902–03 (2005) (Scalia, J. dissenting)
(emphasis omitted).
133. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 692 (Scalia, J. concurring). For a discussion of why Justice
Scalia’s assertion that venerating the Ten Commandments is not the same as venerating
religion in general, see infra notes 167–70 and accompanying text.
134. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). This case struck down a non-denominational prayer delivered
at a public high school graduation. Id. at 585–86.
135. Id. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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6. Coercion
Justice Thomas, in both his Van Orden and Newdow concurrences,
argued that the only government activity that was prohibited by the
Establishment Clause was “actual legal coercion.”136 Under this
approach, a mere governmental “endorsement,” either of religion in
general or of a particular denomination’s beliefs, would not violate the
Constitution. According to Thomas, the Establishment Clause is not
implicated absent the “coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial
support by force of law and threat of penalty,”137 such as “mandatory
observance or mandatory payment of taxes supporting ministers.”138
Thus, all governmental religious expression, as long as it did not directly
“compel” anyone “to do anything,” would be permissible.139
7. Avoiding Divisiveness
Justice Breyer was the only Justice to vote in favor of the Court’s
judgment in both Van Orden and McCreary County.140 Thus, he was the
only Justice to find a constitutional distinction between the Ten
Commandments displayed on a monument in front of a state capital and
inside the courthouse. Although Justice Breyer disclaimed the hope of
finding a “single mechanical formula”141 and declared that there was “no

136. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 693 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Elk Grove Unified
Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 52 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment))
(internal quotation mark omitted). According to Justice Thomas, even this Establishment
Clause limitation should only be directed at the federal government. Id. He argued that the
Establishment Clause was solely designed as a structural protection for federalism—i.e.,
preventing federal interference with state establishments—and thus could not be
incorporated to apply to the states. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 49 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment). As a matter of historical fact, this latter claim is demonstrably incorrect. See
MEYERSON, supra note 59, at 172–76.
137. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 693 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Lee, 505 U.S. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
138. Id. (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 729 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
concurring)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
139. Id. at 694.
140. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 848 (2005); Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 698
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). He also voted with the Court majority in Newdow,
albeit without offering an opinion on the constitutionality of the Pledge of Allegiance.
Newdow, 542 U.S. at 3. He was however, in the dissent in Salazar v. Buono, 130 U.S. 1803,
1842 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
141. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 699 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
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test-related substitute for the exercise of legal judgment,”142 the ultimate
concern he expressed was the need to avoid political divisiveness.143
The features of the Texas monument display that led him to
conclude that they did not threaten to cause such divisiveness were that
they were part of a display that included numerous secular messages and
they had been on public grounds for forty years with no previous legal
complaint.144 By contrast, he said, the history of the Kentucky
courthouse displays “indicates a governmental effort substantially to
promote religion.”145
But most significantly to Justice Breyer, it seems, the recency of the
courthouse displays presented a much greater threat; unlike the Texas
monument, “a more contemporary state effort to focus attention upon a
religious text is certainly likely to prove divisive in a way that this
longstanding, pre-existing monument has not.”146 Removing the older
monument, he warned, was not simply unnecessary for avoiding
divisiveness but would evince such “hostility” to religion as to “create
the very kind of religiously based divisiveness that the Establishment
Clause seeks to avoid.”147
B. Seven Flawed Standards
There is obviously no way to synthesize these seven standards into a
single usable test. It is also beyond question that no single rule could
unite this disparate Court. What is perhaps more surprising, though, is
that each of their standards is fundamentally flawed.
Justice Thomas’s claim that the Establishment Clause only prohibits
legal coercion is the easiest to dismiss, as such a radical change to our
legal culture has been wisely rejected by every other member of the
Court.148 Justice Thomas’s standard would eviscerate the “principle of

142. Id. at 700, 703–04.
143. See id.
144. Id. at 702–03.
145. Id. at 703.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 704.
148. See Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of Religious
Endorsements, 94 MINN. L. REV. 972, 998 (2010) (“Of the nine Justices currently on the
Court, the best guess is that eight of them support this ban on denominational religious
speech—the only dissenter seems to be Justice Thomas.”).
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denominational neutrality.”149 It would permit the “permanent erection
of a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall” and allow a state
government, and indeed the federal government, to “proselytize on
behalf of a particular religion.”150
Even the Justices who have been most willing to allow religious
governmental speech have recognized that the Establishment Clause
was “designed to stop the Federal Government from asserting a
preference for one religious denomination or sect over others. Given
the ‘incorporation’ of the Establishment Clause . . . , States are
prohibited as well from establishing a religion or discriminating between
sects.”151 As Justice Scalia asserted, were a government to “take sides in
a theological dispute” with an “endorsement of a particular version of
the Decalogue as authoritative,” that would violate the Establishment
Clause as an “impermissible endorsement of a particular religious
view.”152
Accepting that at least some form of governmental endorsement is
unconstitutional, the Justices have been divided over whether the
Establishment Clause prohibits only sectarian endorsements or extends
to prohibit endorsements of religion over non-religion. Based on the
way these arguments are framed today, neither side can withstand
careful scrutiny.
One weakness with the argument of those who would permit the
government to endorse religion over non-religion is that it would violate
several fundamental precepts of religious freedom. First, it contradicts
the principle that the “government has no legitimate role in shaping the

149. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982); see also Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 214–15 (1963) (quoting an unpublished opinion of Judge Alphonso Taft in Minor v.
Board of Education of Cincinnati (Super. Ct. of Cincinnati 1870) (Taft, J., dissenting), in THE
BIBLE IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 351, 415 (Cincinnati, Robert Clarke & Co. 1870) (“The
government is neutral, and, while protecting all, it prefers none, and it disparages none.”
(emphasis omitted))).
150. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 661 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
151. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
152. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 894 n.4 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Interestingly, Justice Thomas joined this dissent. See also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 641
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I will further concede that our constitutional tradition . . . [has]
ruled out of order government-sponsored endorsement of religion . . . where the endorsement
is sectarian, in the sense of specifying details upon which men and women who believe in a
benevolent, omnipotent Creator and Ruler of the world are known to differ (for example, the
divinity of Christ).”). Justice Thomas also signed onto Justice Scalia’s Lee dissent. Id. at 631.
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religious opinions of the American people.”153 The government is not
charged with being the nation’s religious teacher. As James Madison
wrote, this principle requires that, “[in] matters of Religion, no man’s
right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society, and that Religion is
wholly exempt from its cognizance.”154
A second flaw, to again quote Madison, is that permitting the
government to pronounce that it prefers those who believe in religion
“degrades from the equal rank of Citizens all those whose opinions in
Religion do not bend to those of the Legislative authority.”155 As
Justice O’Connor explained, it violates the principles behind the
Establishment Clause for the government to send “a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community.”156
Finally, the position that government can endorse religion in general
but not a particular religion is doomed to collapse over the fact that
governmental endorsement of religion will inevitably conform to the
views and practices of the majority religion. Take, for example, a
concept as seemingly all-inclusive as National Prayer Day. According to
federal law, the President must “issue each year a proclamation
designating the first Thursday in May as a National Day of Prayer on
which the people of the United States may turn to God in prayer and
meditation at churches, in groups, and as individuals.”157 Even when
attempting to talk to all religions, Congress could not avoid singling out
“churches” in preference to mosques, synagogues, and other places
where non-Christians pray. Preferences for religion in general will
always tend toward preferences to “the standard of the predominant
sect.”158
Those contending that the Establishment Clause bars all
endorsement of religion, including religion in general over non-religion,
as well as those who assert that the “central Establishment Clause value
of official religious neutrality” is violated when government acts with

153. Laycock, supra note 2, at 230.
154. Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 2 THE WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON 183, 185 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901).
155. Id. at 188.
156. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
157. 36 U.S.C. § 119 (2012) (emphasis added).
158. Madison, Detatched Memoranda, supra note 77, at 561.
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the purpose of favoring “religion over irreligion,”159 face an
insurmountable burden. Neither principle has ever been consistently
applied, even by their most ardent supporters.160 As Justice Kennedy
argued when the endorsement test was first used by the Court,
Either the endorsement test must invalidate scores of traditional
practices recognizing the place religion holds in our culture, or it
must be twisted and stretched to avoid inconsistency with
practices we know to have been permitted in the past, while
condemning similar practices with no greater endorsement effect
simply by reason of their lack of historical antecedent.161
The Court has upheld legislative prayer,162 property tax exemptions
for church property,163 and the Pledge of Allegiance to a nation “under
God,”164 among many other governmental activities that unmistakably
fail the endorsement test’s requirement of total neutrality between
religion and non-religion.165
As one commentator noted, “Any
explanation of why these practices survive constitutional scrutiny under
this test, while school prayer and other practices invalidated by the
Court do not, is hopelessly inadequate.”166
In reality, the best explanation for the inconsistent application of the
endorsement test may well be the Justices’ “fear of the backlash that
could result from the full enforcement of the neutrality principle.”167
The consequence from such enforcement “would be too unpopular, do
159. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860, 875 (2005).
160. “One of the criticisms sometimes made of the Endorsement Test is that it cannot
account for all of the practices that the Court has upheld.” Strasser, supra note 83, at 566.
161. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 674 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
162. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
163. Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
164. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 5 (2004), abrogated on other
grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
While the Court rejected the challenge to the Pledge on procedural grounds, no Justice even
intimated that the Pledge would violate the Establishment Clause.
165. See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 891 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(detailing “the variety of circumstances in which this Court . . . has approved government
action ‘undertaken with the specific intention of improving the position of religion’” (quoting
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 616 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting))).
166. Epstein, supra note 19, at 2173–74.
167. Thomas B. Colby, A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions? Justice Scalia, the Ten
Commandments, and the Future of the Establishment Clause, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1123
(2006); see also McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 890 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court has not
had the courage (or the foolhardiness) to apply the neutrality principle consistently.”).
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too much damage to the Court’s credibility, and do too little good for
religious minorities and nonbelievers.”168 Justice Scalia terms the
Court’s “instinct for self-preservation” as the factor that keeps the
Justices from going “too far down the road of an enforced neutrality
that contradicts both historical fact and current practice.”169 Thus, the
endorsement test is simply “ignored” when its application would
“prohibit things the Court seems to wish to protect.”170
One way some Justices have tried to explain how obviously religious
governmental expression has passed the endorsement test is by terming
such permitted expression ceremonial deism. The phrase “ceremonial
deism” was apparently invented in 1962 by Walter Rostow, Dean of
Yale Law School.171 He used the phrase to denote a “class of public
activity, which . . . [could] be accepted as so conventional and
uncontroversial as to be constitutional.” 172
“Ceremonial deism” is, in reality, quite a peculiar phrase.173 The
word “deism” is generally associated with the religious beliefs of
Thomas Paine and several of the other Framers.174 “Deism in America
was a product of French intellectual thought in the eighteenth century
and had among its fundamental principles the existence of a Supreme
Deity, worthy of adoration, and the necessity of religious liberty. It also
eschewed theological and ecclesiastical extremes.”175 Modifying the
168. Douglas Laycock, Church and State in the United States: Competing Conceptions
and Historic Changes, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 503, 529 (2006).
169. McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 892–93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
170. John M. Bickers, Standing on Holy Ground: How Rethinking Justiciability Might
Bring Peace to the Establishment Clause, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 415, 432 (2012).
171. Arthur E. Sutherland, Book Review, 40 IND. L.J. 83, 86 & n.7 (1964) (reviewing
WILBER G. KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS (1964)).
172. Id. at 86.
173.
Note that “ceremonial deism” is a term of art and distinct from the theological
definition of Deism as “the belief, claiming foundation solely upon the evidence of
reason, in the existence of God as the creator of the universe who after setting it in
motion abandoned it, assumed no control over life, exerted no influence on natural
phenomena, and gave no supernatural revelation.”
Caroline Mala Corbin, Ceremonial Deism and the Reasonable Religious Outsider, 57 UCLA
L. REV. 1545, 1549 n.14 (2010) (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 348 (William Morris ed., 1978)).
174. Thomas Paine, Of the Religion of Deism Compared with the Christian Religion, and
the Superiority of the Former over the Latter (1804), reprinted in ‘IN GOD WE TRUST’: THE
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND IDEAS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING FATHERS 430 (Norman
Cousins ed., 1958).
175. Epstein, supra note 19, at 2091 (footnotes omitted).
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word “deism” with the word “ceremonial” does more than merely limit
the location of religious phraseology to “ceremonial, as opposed to
theological, settings.”176 It also shrinks the meaning of “deism” to nonsectarian religious expression.177
While no majority opinion of the Supreme Court has either explicitly
adopted or rejected the concept of ceremonial deism,178 a few Justices
have stated that it would help resolve difficult Establishment Clause
cases. According to Justice O’Connor, the concept of ceremonial deism
includes the Pledge of Allegiance, as well as “the national motto (‘In
God We Trust’), religious references in traditional patriotic songs such
as The Star-Spangled Banner, and the words with which the Marshal of
this Court opens each of its sessions (‘God save the United States and
this honorable Court’).”179
One of the major objections to the category of ceremonial deism is
that it is a result-oriented label, easily “subject to manipulation.”180
Ceremonial deism has been termed an “amorphous concept” which has
been frequently utilized “as a springboard from which to hold that other
challenged practices,” such as the cross in a city’s insignia or a state’s
celebration of Good Friday, do not violate the Establishment Clause.181
The most fundamental objection to the concept of ceremonial deism,
though, is that it is built on the erroneous, if not dishonest, foundation
that religious words have no religious significance. When Justice
Brennan first expressed support for the concept, he said the examples of

176. Id.
177. Cass Sunstein has defined ceremonial deism as the “non-coercive public displays
that refer to God in the way that is time honored and fits with our traditions.” Cass R.
Sunstein, Celebrating God, Constitutionally, 83 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 567, 567 (2006); see
also Corbin, supra note 173, at 1546 (“Ceremonial deism is defined as a longstanding religious
practice—sometimes extending back to the nation’s founding—with de minimis and
nonsectarian religious content.”).
178. Strasser, supra note 83, at 559; see also Hill, supra note 36, at 717 (“[T]he Supreme
Court has shown no great appetite for addressing the constitutionality of ceremonial deism.”).
179. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 37 (2004) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
180. Laycock, supra note 2, at 240; see also Michael M. Maddigan, Comment, The
Establishment Clause, Civil Religion, and the Public Church, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 293, 345
(1993) (“Ceremonial deism, then, is a nebulous and ill-defined concept that has become
nothing more than a shorthand for what some Justices believe are ‘constitutionally acceptable
religious practices.’”).
181. Epstein, supra note 19, at 2086 & n.13 (describing Murray v. City of Austin, 947
F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1991) (cross in city insignia), and Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d 765 (9th
Cir. 1991) (upholding Good Friday holiday)).
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ceremonial deism were “protected from Establishment Clause scrutiny
chiefly because they have lost through rote repetition any significant
religious content.”182 Similarly, Justice O’Connor said that “[a]ny
religious freight the words may have been meant to carry originally has
long since been lost.”183
This assertion is incorrect: “[I]t is simply untrue for many people
that ‘under God’ has lost its religious meaning.”184 While it is
doubtlessly accurate to say that many people do not feel these phrases
have religious significance, to many others the religious language
continues to express deep religious meaning. Assertions to the contrary
“demean the expressions and insult the intelligence.”185
A similar critique can be made of the Van Orden plurality’s standard
asserting that the Establishment Clause is not violated if the government
is simply “recognizing our religious heritage.”186 The problem with this
approach is that it, by ipse dixit, denies the religious nature of religious
words.

182. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
183. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 39–41 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); see also
Bell, supra note 20, at 1274–75 (“When considering phrases such as ‘God Save the United
States and this Honorable Court’ and ‘In God We Trust,’ the Court has engaged in
‘secularization,’ justifying religious practices and expressions based on their context or
tradition.” (footnote omitted)); Andrew Rotstein, Note, Good Faith? Religious-Secular
Parallelism and the Establishment Clause, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1763, 1772 (1993) (stating that
certain religious phrases “have largely or totally lost their religious significance because of
their passive character or their longstanding repetition in a civic context”).
184. Thomas C. Berg, The Pledge of Allegiance and the Limited State, 8 TEX. REV. L. &
POL. 41, 48 (2003); see also Daniel O. Conkle, Religious Expression and Symbolism in the
American Constitutional Tradition: Governmental Neutrality, but Not Indifference, 13 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 417, 433 (2006) (“By all indications, the governmental expression in
question does promote and endorse religion, and it does so deliberately.”).
185. Steven D. Smith, How Is America “Divided by God”?, 27 MISS. C. L. REV. 141, 155
(2007). Many have also felt that the denial of religious meaning can be seen as insulting
people of faith who see great religious significance in religious language. See, e.g., Myers v.
Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395, 407 (4th Cir. 2005) (saying that “it is demeaning to
persons of any faith to assert that the words ‘under God’ contain no religious significance”);
Robert A. Schapiro, The Consequences of Human Rights Foundationalism, 54 EMORY L.J.
171, 179 (2005) (stating that treating references to God as meaningless “would be insulting to
those who take references to God quite seriously”).
186. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 684 (2005) (plurality opinion). In arguing that
the Pledge of Allegiance did not violate the Establishment Clause, several Justices,
“repeatedly used the words ‘describe,’ ‘acknowledge,’ and their synonyms.” Hill, supra note
36, at 729.
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According to Douglas Laycock, this sort of approach is essentially “a
polite lie.”187
The assertion that religious speech has become
“secularized” permits courts to uphold governmental religious speech
“but still maintain lip service to the constitutional principle of religious
neutrality.”188 When a legislative chaplain is leading legislators in a
devout prayer, it is disingenuous to contend that this pious activity has
only been designed to “recognize[] the rich religious heritage of our
country”189 or is “simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely
held among the people of this country.”190 A sustainable legal rule
cannot be premised on a transparent “legal fiction,” one in which courts
insist that governmental religious speech and actions are “nonreligious
as a matter of law, no matter how religious they might be as a matter of
fact.”191
Justice Breyer’s approach of avoiding religious divisiveness has the
virtue of forthrightness as well as a philosophical linkage to the thoughts
and practices of George Washington.192 Nonetheless, as Justice Breyer
himself admitted, his methodology is too amorphous to be described as
a legal standard. He relied not upon “any particular test” but instead
“upon consideration of the basic purposes of the First Amendment’s
Religion Clauses themselves.”193 In his analysis, there is “no test-related
substitute for the exercise of legal judgment.”194
An obvious difficulty with this approach is that there is no way to
predict ahead of time how a court will exercise its legal judgment in
determining what religious governmental actions will be deemed
unacceptably divisive. Moreover, the fluid nature of relying on the
“purposes” of the First Amendment will inevitably lead to the
perception, if not reality, that Justices are “ruling now this way, now

187. Laycock, supra note 2, at 225.
188. Christopher C. Lund, The Future of the Establishment Clause in Context: A
Response to Ledewitz, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 767, 768 (2012).
189. Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, 534 F.3d 352, 356 (4th Cir. 2008)
(O’Connor, J., retired, sitting by designation), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 909 (2009). It was
similarly disingenuous when the Court contended that a governmental display of a nativity
scene merely “depict[ed] the historical origins” of Christmas. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 680 (1984).
190. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983).
191. Lund, supra note 188, at 769.
192. See infra notes 286–92 and accompanying text.
193. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 703–04 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment).
194. Id. at 700.
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that—thumbs up or thumbs down—as their personal preferences
dictate.”195
One of the major obstacles that has prevented the Court from
reaching a workable standard for judging the constitutionality of
religious government speech is the Justices’ collective misreading of the
actions and understandings of the Framers who helped draft and
implement the First Amendment. The Court has asserted continually
that history plays an especially critical role in the creation of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.196 As Justice Wiley Rutledge
declared, “No provision of the Constitution is more closely tied to or
given content by its generating history than the religious clause of the
First Amendment. It is at once the refined product and the terse
summation of that history.”197 It is thus particularly disheartening that
the history relied upon is so often “bad history.” 198
Justices have been accurately categorized as engaging in “law office
histor[y],” in which they “selectively recount[] facts, emphasizing data
that support the recorder’s own prepossessions and minimizing
significant facts that complicate or conflict with that bias.”199 They
create “a stark, crabbed, oversimplified picture of the past, developed
largely to plead a case.”200 If the Justices had a more complete and more
accurate understanding of how the Framers understood and utilized
governmental religious expression, they might have an easier time
creating a predictable, usable standard.

195. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 891 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
196. “From the Supreme Court’s first Religion Clause case, . . . Justices have appealed
to the history surrounding the writing of the First Amendment, the Founders generally, and
specific Founders to shine light upon the meaning of the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses.” Hall, supra note 18, at 567.
197. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 33 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting); see also
Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 670 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (stating that “the meaning of the Clause is to be
determined by reference to historical practices and understandings”); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The true meaning of the Establishment
Clause can only be seen in its history.”).
198. Green, supra note 13, at 1719.
199. Daniel L. Dreisbach, A Lively and Fair Experiment: Religion and the American
Constitutional Tradition, 49 EMORY L.J. 223, 234 (2000) (book review) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
200. Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, in
ESSAYS ON THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 77, 80 (Gottfried Dietze ed., 1964).
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IV. HOW THE FRAMERS SPOKE ABOUT RELIGION
We should not expect the framing generation to have considered the
relationship between religion and government in a simplistic way. They
were capable of sophisticated, multifaceted thinking, and the balance
they struck reflects a complexity that modern commentators have often
underestimated. The inability to recognize the nuanced compromise
reached by the Framers has contributed to the Court’s failure to reach
any sort of consensus on the proper test for evaluating the
Establishment Clause.
A. Never a Christian Nation
Justices who view the Constitution as limiting governmental
religious speech erroneously assume that, except for Jefferson and
Madison, the Framers viewed the First Amendment solely as protection
for Christians.201 In McCreary County, for example, Justice Souter,
writing for the majority, stated that “history shows that the religion of
concern to the Framers was not that of the monotheistic faiths generally,
but Christianity in particular.”202 To support this conclusion, Justice
Souter quotes from Justice Story’s book Commentaries on the
Constitution: “Justice Story probably reflected the thinking of the
framing generation when he wrote in his Commentaries that the
purpose of the Clause was ‘not to countenance, much less to advance,
Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating Christianity;
but to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects.’”203
In reality, Justice Story was wrong about the framing generation, and
his mistake was made for the same reasons as Justice Daniel Brewer’s
201. See, e.g., Harris v. City of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401, 1410 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Perhaps
originally the Religion Clauses merely sought to protect the diversity of faiths and practices
within Christianity itself.”).
202. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 880 (2005); see also Freedom from
Religion Found., Inc. v. Obama, 705 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1062 (W.D. Wis. 2010) (“If one were to
read the establishment clause as permitting any practice in existence around the time of the
framers, this would likely mean that the government would be free to discriminate against all
non-Christians.”), vacated on other grounds, 641 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2011).
203. McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 880. Although the quote is from 3 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1871, at 728 (Boston,
Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833), Justice Souter, for some reason, cites to a secondary source,
ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND
CURRENT FICTION 13 (1988), a book that Mark Tushnet accurately describes as “a work of
crank constitutional law,” Mark Tushnet, Book Review, 45 LA. L. REV. 175, 175 (1984)
(reviewing ROBERT CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND
CURRENT FICTION (1982)).
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erroneous assertion sixty years later that the United States “is a
Christian nation.”204 Both Justices Story and Brewer relied almost
exclusively on the practices of the colonies and states, rather than those
of the federal government following the enactment of the Constitution.
For example, Justice Brewer, other than quoting the First Amendment
and the constitutional provision giving the President ten days, “Sundays
excepted,” to decide whether to sign or veto legislation,205 only cited
colonial charters, the Declaration of Independence, and the common
law systems of Pennsylvania and New York.206 Similarly, Justice Story
only cites one source for support, the House of Representatives’ debate
on the First Amendment, in which neither the word “Christianity” is
mentioned nor is there a discussion of other religions.207
Justices Story and Brewer were wrong. A comprehensive review of
the practices of the framing generation shows that they neither believed
that America was a “Christian Nation” nor that the First Amendment
only protected Christianity. That review also shows the fundamental
error in Justice Scalia’s assumption that the Framers’ use of religion in
their public speech endorsed “inescapably the God of monotheism.”208
The key to understanding the Framing Generation is the realization
that they believed that the Constitution had created a new entity, a
national government not dependent on the state governments, one that
was capable of having a distinct identity. The Framers had a vision of
religious liberty for the national government that was entirely different
from the concept that prevailed in the several states.
This distinction can be seen in two famous letters written by
Presidents Washington and Jefferson. In the first, Washington’s 1790
letter to the Hebrew Congregation in Newport Rhode Island, he
explained his vision for American universal religious freedom. He
began by acknowledging the change in perception of the source of
religious freedom: “It is now no more that toleration is spoken of, as if it
was by the indulgence of one class of people, that another enjoyed the

204. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892).
205. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
206. Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 466–72.
207. STORY, supra note 203, § 1868, at 726. In a footnote, Story cites “2 Lloyd’s Deb.
195, 196,” which corresponds to 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 730–31. Id.
208. McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 894 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
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exercise of their inherent natural rights.”209 He then pronounced his
description of the American guarantee of religious equality: “For
happily the Government of the United States, which gives to bigotry no
sanction, to persecution no assistance requires only that they who live
under its protection should demean themselves as good citizens, in
giving it on all occasions their effectual support.”210
Note that Washington placed his focus on “the Government of the
United States.” Under the Constitution, a distinct national perspective
of freedom of religion was created; it was the “Government of the
United States” that no longer sanctioned religious bigotry, regardless of
the discrimination that might still occur in the several states.
Similarly, a careful reading of the 1802 letter in which Jefferson
provided the metaphor of “a wall of separation between Church &
State” reveals that that wall was only legally required for the federal
government.211 Jefferson’s letter had been written in response to a letter
from a committee of Baptists from Danbury, Connecticut.212 They had
written Jefferson to complain about their home state’s religious
establishment.213 They wrote that Connecticut did not accept the
Baptists’ view of religious liberty, which was that “the legitimate Power
of civil Government extends no further than to punish the man who
works ill to his neighbour.”214 In Connecticut, they said, “Religion is
consider[e]d as the first object of Legislation; & therefore what religious
privileges we enjoy (as a minor part of the State) we enjoy as favors
granted, and not as inalienable rights.”215
The committee did not ask Jefferson to intervene directly in state
affairs. In fact, they acknowledged both “that the President of the
[U]nited States, is not the national Legislator, & also sensible that the

209. Letter from George Washington to the Hebrew Congregation in Newport, Rhode
Island (Aug. 18, 1790), in 6 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES
284, 285 (Mark A. Mastromarino ed., 1996).
210. Id. (emphasis added).
211. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1,
1802), in 36 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 258, 258 (Barbara B. Oberg ed., 2009); see
also Daniel L. Dreisbach, “Sowing Useful Truths and Principles”: The Danbury Baptists,
Thomas Jefferson, and the “Wall of Separation,” 39 J. CHURCH & ST. 455 (1997).
212. Dreisbach, supra note 211, at 457.
213. Letter from Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins, and Stephen S. Nelson to
Thomas Jefferson, reprinted in Dreisbach, supra note 211, at 460.
214. Id. at 460 (emphasis omitted).
215. Id.
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national government cannot destroy the Laws of each State.”216
Nonetheless, they expressed the hope that “the sentiments of our
beloved President . . . will shine & prevail through all these States and
all the world till Hierarchy and tyranny be destroyed from the Earth.”217
Jefferson’s well-known response echoed the Connecticut Baptists’
view that the national government’s understanding of the proper
relationship between religion and government could serve as an
exemplar for the individual States.218 Jefferson, after expressing
agreement that “religion is a matter which lies solely between Man & his
God . . . [and] the legitimate powers of government reach actions only,
& not opinions,” declared his view that the national government was
restricted by the First Amendment, citing the “act of the whole
American people which declared that their legislature should ‘make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof,’ thus building a wall of separation between Church &
State.”219 Jefferson then stated that he hoped the example of the
national government would be followed in each state: “[A]dhering to
this expression of the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the rights of
conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction the progress of those
sentiments which tend to restore to man all his natural rights . . . .”220
There are several factors that led to the creation of a national view
of the “rights of conscience” that was distinct from the individual states
and far more respectful of those who did not share the majority’s
religious faith. One of the most important was that, while the individual
states began as narrowly focused, religiously homogeneous
communities, the United States was born a pluralistic nation made up of
multiple religious groups.
A statistical analysis conducted by Roger Finke and Rodney Stark
for their book The Churching of America, 1776–2005 reveals how much

216. Id.
217. Id.
218. In a later letter, Jefferson similarly explained that although many New England
states still had established churches, the United States Constitution “protects the rights of
conscience against the enterprises of the civil authority. It has not left the religion of its
citizens under the power of its public functionaries . . . .” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
the Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church at New London, Connecticut (Feb. 4, 1809), in
16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 331, 331–32 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903).
219. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association, supra note 211,
at 258 (emphasis omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I).
220. Id.
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more diverse the new nation as a whole was than the individual states.221
In the United States, larger denominations were far less prominent and
smaller denominations were far more numerous. For example, the
Congregationalists, the largest denomination in Massachusetts in 1776,
made up more than 71% of all the state’s religious congregations.222
Southern states, while not as lopsided, were still dominated by a single
group, with Episcopalian congregations, at 34.6%, the greatest number
in Virginia, and Presbyterians, at 28.5%, the largest in North Carolina.223
No state matched the diversity of the entire United States, in which the
largest denomination, Congregationalists, comprised barely more than
20% of all congregations.224
Another way to measure religious diversity is to calculate the
number of significant-sized denominations.
Eight different
denominations—Congregationalists,
Presbyterians,
Episcopalians,
Baptists, Quakers, the German Reformed, Lutherans, and the Dutch
Reformed—accounted for at least 3% of all the nation’s
congregations.225 Most individual states contained only four to six
denominations that comprised at least 3% of their congregations, with
New York being the only state with eight denominations of that
proportion.226
Small denominations, those containing less than 3% of the
congregations in a particular area, were also a much more significant
political factor on the national level. In the United States, the
combination of small denominations—including Methodists, Catholics,
Moravians, Separatists and Independents, Dunkers, Mennonites,
Huguenots, Sandemanians, and Jews—contained more than one-third
of the number of congregations of the largest national denomination,
Congregationalists.227 Except in Pennsylvania (which had a similar ratio
to the national level), the predominant state denomination dwarfed the
combined small local denominations by between 4–1 and 38–1.228 It is
not surprising, therefore, to find more deference paid to the interests
221. ROGER FINKE & RODNEY STARK, THE CHURCHING OF AMERICA, 1776–2005:
WINNERS AND LOSERS IN OUR RELIGIOUS ECONOMY 281–94 (2005).
222. Id. at 286 tbl.A1.
223. Id. at 288 tbl.A1.
224. Id. at 284 tbl.A1.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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and sensitivities of religious minorities at the national level than at the
state level, and far more pressure placed on the local level to assist the
most powerful denominations.
In part, this was a phenomenon foreshadowed by the observation in
James Madison’s Federalist 10 essay, in which he warned that in
individual states, with their relatively small populations, it was easier for
“a majority [to] be found of the same party” and to “concert and
execute their plans of oppression.”229 The national government, with a
much larger population, would “[e]xtend the sphere, and . . . take in a
greater variety of parties and interests.”230 This, Madison predicted,
would “make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a
common motive to invade the rights of other citizens.”231
Many of the Framers understood that to govern and unite a
religiously diverse population would require a different approach than
that practiced in the individual states. For example, Oliver Ellsworth, a
Connecticut delegate to the Constitutional Convention, wrote an essay
under the name “A Landowner” explaining why national religious tests
would be impractical:
A test in favor of any one denomination of Christians would be
to the last degree absurd in the United States. If it were in favor
of either Congregationalists, Presbyterians, Episcopalians,
Baptists, or Quakers, it would incapacitate more than threefourths of the American citizens for any public office; and thus
degrade them from the rank of freemen.232
Daniel Shute, first minister of the Second Congregational Church of
Hingham, Massachusetts, also used the size and diversity of the United
States to argue against religious oaths:
In this great and extensive empire, there is and will be a great
variety of sentiments in religion among its inhabitants. Upon the
plan of a religious test, the question I think must be, who shall be
excluded from national trusts? Whatever answer bigotry may

229.
230.
231.
232.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 52 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
Id.
Id.
Oliver Ellsworth, A Landholder VII (Dec. 17, 1787), in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 497, 499 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1978).
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suggest, the dictates of candour and equity, I conceive, will be
none.233
In addition to the demographic realities of “this great and extensive
empire,” a second major factor in the creation of a new national view of
freedom of religion was the personal convictions of the earliest national
leaders. While the contributions of Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison are well known, it may have been the words and actions of
George Washington that did the most to create the American vision of
the proper relationship between government and religion.
B. George Washington and the Tax to Support Christian Teachers
Arguably the most critical moment in the development of
Washington’s insistence on the creation of a national vision of the rights
of conscience occurred a few years prior to the drafting of the First
Amendment, during the battle in Virginia over Patrick Henry’s bill to
authorize taxation to support “teachers of the Christian religion.”234
Under Henry’s proposal, taxpayers could designate the “society of
Christians” to which they wished to have their money allocated.235 The
revenue from those who did not designate a “Christian society” was to
be distributed, “under the direction of the General Assembly, for the
encouragement of seminaries of learning.”236
The fight to defeat the bill was led by James Madison. He largely
orchestrated a ten-month political campaign, from December 1785–

233. Convention Debates, 31 January, A.M. (Jan. 31, 1788), in 6 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1373, 1376, 1379 n.5 (John P.
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 2000) (emphasis omitted).
234. Patrick Henry, A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian
Religion (1784), reprinted in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 supplemental app. at 72
(1947) (title case omitted).
235. Id. at 73. In a cramped attempt at religious sensitivity, the bill gave Quakers and
Mennonites, who did not use paid religious teachers, more freedom as to how the money
should be spent than the other Christian denominations. The bill required other
denominations to appropriate the money for the “provision for a Minister or Teacher of the
Gospel of their denomination, or the providing place of divine worship, and to none other use
whatsoever,” while Quakers and Mennonites were permitted to place the money “in their
general fund, to be disposed of in a manner which they shall think best calculated to promote
their particular mode of worship.” Id. at 74.
236. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 853 n.1
(Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Henry, supra note 234, at 74).
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October 1786, to generate state wide opposition to the proposal.237 He
wrote a petition, his “Memorial and Remonstrance,” to help garner
signatures to present to the legislature.238 This petition declared that
“[r]eligion is wholly exempt from [the] . . . cognizance” of “Civil
Society” in general and the legislature in particular.239 Madison also
stated, “It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such
homage and such only as he believes to be acceptable to him.”240
Madison had written his petition anonymously, and when George
Mason sent a copy to George Washington, Mason did not tell him who
had written it but said merely that it had been “confided to me by a
particular Freind, whose Name I am not at Liberty to mention.”241
Mason urged Washington to sign the petition. Although Washington
declined, his letter explaining why reveals a significant aspect of
Washington’s thoughts on the relationship between religion and
government.
Washington began by saying that he did not object in principle to a
tax to support religious teaching, as long as minority religions were
provided appropriate exemptions:
Altho’ no mans sentiments are more opposed to any kind of
restraint upon religious principles than mine are; yet I must
confess, that I am not amongst the number of those who are so
much alarmed at the thoughts of making people pay towards the
support of that which they profess, if of the denominations of
Christians; or declare themselves Jews, Mahomitans or
otherwise, & thereby obtain proper relief. 242
Nonetheless, Washington continued, he did not believe the
assessment bill was good for Virginia, and he actually hoped that the bill
would be defeated: “As the matter now stands, I wish an assessment had
237. See James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments
(June 20, 1785), in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 295 (Robert A. Rutland & William
M.E. Rachal eds., 1973).
238. See id. at 298.
239. Id. at 299.
240. Id.
241. Letter from George Mason to George Washington (Oct. 2, 1785), in 3 THE PAPERS
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: CONFEDERATION SERIES 290, 290 (W.W. Abbot & Dorothy
Twohig eds., 1994) [hereinafter 3 PGW: CONFEDERATION SERIES].
242. Letter from George Washington to George Mason (Oct. 3, 1785), in 3 PGW:
CONFEDERATION SERIES, supra note 241, at 292, 292–93 (emphasis omitted). At the time of
Washington’s letter, he had not yet read Madison’s petition, and he told Mason that he
intended to read “with attention.” Id. at 292 (emphasis omitted).
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never been agitated—& as it has gone so far, that the Bill could die an
easy death; because I think it will be productive of more quiet to the
State, than by enacting it into a Law . . . .”243 In light of the strong
opposition of a “respectable minority,” Washington warned, passage of
the bill would “rankle, & perhaps convulse the State.”244
Washington’s letter reveals a deep awareness of the dangers of
political strife that can be caused by an insensitive intermingling of
government and religion.245 As historian Paul Boller noted, “The
agitation over the Virginia assessment plan seems to have convinced
him, once and for all, of the impracticality of all proposals of this kind
for state support of religion.”246 A few years later, as President,
Washington would write that “[r]eligious controversies are always
productive of more acrimony and irreconcilable hatreds than those
which spring from any other cause.”247
While serving as Commander-in-Chief during the Revolutionary
War, Washington had occasionally used explicit Christian references in
his writing to the troops. In 1776, he urged the soldiers to “attend
carefully upon religious exercises” and stated that he hoped that every
officer “will endeavour so to live, and act, as becomes a Christian
Soldier defending the dearest Rights and Liberties of his country.”248 In
1778, he told his troops that while they were “zealously performing the

243. Id. at 293.
244. Id.
245. Madison included a similar concern in his Memorial and Remonstrance. One of the
reasons he listed to oppose the tax was that it would “destroy that moderation and harmony
which the forbearance of our laws to intermeddle with Religion has produced among its
several sects.” Madison, supra note 237, at 302. Making an argument very similar to
Washington’s, Madison stated that
[t]he very appearance of the Bill has transformed “that Christian forbearance, love
and charity,” which of late mutually prevailed, into animosities and jealousies, which
may not soon be appeased. What mischiefs may not be dreaded, should this enemy
to the public quiet be armed with the force of a law?
Id. at 303 (quoting VA. CONST. of 1776, § 16).
246. PAUL F. BOLLER, JR., GEORGE WASHINGTON AND RELIGION 122 (1963).
247. Letter from George Washington to Edward Newenham (June 22, 1792), in 10 THE
PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 493, 493 (Robert F. Haggard &
Mark A. Mastromarino eds., 2002).
248. General Orders (July 9, 1776), in 5 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON:
REVOLUTIONARY WAR SERIES 245, 246 (W.W. Abbot & Dorothy Twohig eds., 1993)
(footnote omitted).
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duties of good Citizens and soldiers,” they should also “add the more
distinguished Character of Christian.”249
Washington’s most famous Christian reference came at the end of
one of his final acts as commander in chief. On June 8, 1783, he wrote a
letter, generally referred to as the “Circular Letter,” to the thirteen state
governors to convince them of the need for the individual states to cede
more power to a central government.250 He ended his thirty-six page
letter with a plea that everyone demean themselves “with that Charity,
humility and pacific temper of mind, which were the Characteristicks of
the Divine Author of our blessed Religion.”251
According to historian Paul Boller, this description of the “humility”
of “the Divine Author of our blessed Religion” is “unmistakably a
reference to Jesus Christ.”252 The final paragraph of Washington’s long
missive was deeply pious, a clearly Christian ending to his call to the
governors for a stronger national government.
This was, however, the last official utterance in which Washington
employed Christian terminology. As President, whenever he used
religious discourse in his public communication, he carefully, and
without exception, chose inclusive, nonsecular language.
One can see the radical change in Washington’s writing by
comparing his Presidential Thanksgiving proclamations with one from
the Continental Congress twelve years earlier. Under the Articles of
Confederation, Congress truly represented the states.
The
Confederation Congress, like the Continental Congress that preceded it,
largely accepted the consensus view among the states that government
should endorse and support the Protestant faith.253 Between June 12,
1775, and October 11, 1782, Congress appointed a dozen days for either
fasting, prayer, or thanksgiving,254 and most were decidedly sectarian.
The November 1, 1777, Thanksgiving Day proclamation, drafted by Sam
249. General Orders (May 2, 1778), in 15 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON:
REVOLUTIONARY WAR SERIES 13, 13 (Edward G. Lengel ed., 2006).
250. George Washington, Circular to the States (June 8, 1783), in 26 THE WRITINGS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON: FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES 1745–1799, at 483,
485 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1938). See generally 5 DOUGLASS SOUTHALL FREEMAN,
GEORGE WASHINGTON: A BIOGRAPHY 446 (1952).
251. Washington, supra note 250, at 496.
252. BOLLER, supra note 246, at 71.
253. See DEREK H. DAVIS, RELIGION AND THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789:
CONTRIBUTIONS TO ORIGINAL INTENT 84–88 (2000).
254. See id. The fast days were usually in the spring, while the days for thanksgiving
were in the autumn. Id. at 84.
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Adams, began by dictating to each individual citizen that it was “the
indispensable duty of all men to adore the superintending providence of
Almighty God.”255 All of “the good people” of the United States were
urged to “join the penitent confession of their manifold sins, whereby
they had forfeited every favour, and their humble and earnest
supplication that it may please God, through the merits of Jesus Christ,
mercifully to forgive and blot them out of remembrance.”256 In addition
to military success and good harvests, the citizenry was urged to ask
God “to prosper the means of religion for the promotion and
enlargement of that kingdom which consisteth ‘in righteousness, peace
and joy in the Holy Ghost.’”257
By contrast, when Washington issued his Thanksgiving Day
proclamation on October 3, 1789, he carefully chose non-sectarian,
religiously inclusive, language.258
Unlike the 1777 proclamation,
Washington did not command each individual to pray; rather, he said it
was “the duty of all Nations to acknowledge the providence of Almighty
God.”259 Instead of following Sam Adams’ example of referring to
“Jesus Christ” and “the Holy Ghost,” Washington chose the far more
inclusive phraseology such as “Almighty God.”260
Some, like Justice Scalia, assume that Washington’s use of the word
“God” refers to “inescapably the God of monotheism.”261 A return to
the battle over the religious tax in Virginia reveals the error in that
assumption.

255. Samuel Adams, Thanksgiving Day Proclamation (Nov. 1, 1777), in 9 JOURNALS OF
at 854, 854–55 (1907).
256. Id. at 855.
257. Id. (quoting Romans 14:17 (King James)).
258. According to one historian, “This first national thanksgiving proclamation under
the Constitution had been written by William Jackson, one of Washington’s secretaries, and
approved by Washington with only one minor revision.” BOLLER, supra note 246, at 62–63.
259. George Washington, Thanksgiving Proclamation (October 3, 1789), in 4 THE
PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 131, 131 (Dorothy Twohig ed.,
1993) [hereinafter 4 PGW].
260. Id. Later in the Proclamation, Washington used a different religious phrase,
recommending that people be devoted “to the service of that great and glorious Being, who is
the beneficent Author of all the good that was, that is, or that will be.” Id. at 131–32.
261. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 894 n.3 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(emphasis omitted).
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789,
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C. Defining “God”
After Patrick Henry’s proposal to fund Christian teachers died in
Committee, Madison realized that the arguments against the religious
tax had altered the mood in the legislature. On October 31, 1785, he
presented to the legislature a bill Jefferson had drafted six years earlier,
the “Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom.”262
A heated battle arose over the section of the preamble to the bill, in
which Jefferson had written that, “[whereas] Almighty God hath created
the mind free, . . . all attempts to influence it by temporal punishments
or burthens, or by civil incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of
hypocrisy and meanness, and are a departure from the plan of the Holy
Author of our religion.”263 According to Jefferson’s autobiography, an
amendment was proposed to add the phrase “‘Jesus Christ,’ so that it
should read ‘a departure from the plan of Jesus Christ, the holy author
of our religion.’”264
Even though this amendment would not have altered the substance
of the bill, Madison saw it as a threat to the principle of universal
freedom of religion. If the legislature had spoken of “Jesus Christ, the
holy author of our religion,” Madison feared that this would “imply a
restriction of the liberty defined in the Bill, to those professing his
religion only.”265
The amendment was defeated, and Jefferson’s reaction is significant
in illustrating how he viewed the relationship between religious
language and universal freedom. Although his preamble had contained
phrases such as “Almighty God,” “Holy Author of our religion,” and
“Lord both of body and mind,” he did not interpret those phrases as
excluding anyone.266 The omission of explicitly Christian language from
the law, he wrote, proved that the legislature, “meant to comprehend,
within the mantle of its protection, the Jew and the Gentile, the
Christian and Mahometan, the Hindoo, and infidel of every
262. Daniel L. Dreisbach, Thomas Jefferson and Bills Number 82–86 of the Revision of
the Laws of Virginia, 1776–1786: New Light on the Jeffersonian Model of Church-State
Relations, 69 N.C. L. REV. 159, 159–160, 166–68, 183 (1990); see also H.J. ECKENRODE,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN VIRGINIA: A STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE REVOLUTION 113 (1910).
263. ECKENRODE, supra note 262, at 114–15.
264. THOMAS JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, in 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 1, 62 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, The Knickerbocker Press 1892).
265. Madison, Detatched Memoranda, supra note 77, at 556.
266. See ECKENRODE, supra note 262, at 114–15.
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denomination.”267 Thus, language such as “Almighty God” and “holy
author of our religion” did not disregard, but encompassed, the belief
systems of both the polytheistic Hindu268 and the “unbeliever” infidel.269
The Framers were not unique is seeing that the word “God” could
have meaning far beyond monotheism, even when, in the words of
Justice Scalia, the word was written “in the singular, and with a capital
G.”270 For example, anthropologist and mythologist Joseph Campbell
stated that “God is a metaphor for a mystery that absolutely transcends
all categories of human thought. . . .
It’s as simple as that.”271
Philosopher John Dewey described the “active relation between ideal
and actual to which [he] would give the name ‘God.’”272 Author Paul
Tillich meanwhile introduced the concept of a “God above the God of
theism.”273 It is, indeed, accurate to say that today, as at the time of the
framing, “the symbol ‘God’ has many meanings, some of which have
nothing to do with a supernatural creator of the universe.”274
The leading Framers took advantage of the multiple meanings of
“God” to create language that was deliberately theologically equivocal.
They were not denying the obvious religious meaning, but adding to it:
“religious terms need not lose their religious content when nonreligious
meaning is added.”275 Their goal was to produce language that could be
embraced by those with orthodox religious views but still permit all
others to feel included.
While this would be the way that Presidents Washington, Jefferson,
and Madison addressed the population, there was one work produced
by the Continental Congress that also embodied this tactic: The
267. JEFFERSON, supra note 264, at 62.
268. While the actual characterization of the Hindu religion as polytheistic is somewhat
controversial, that is undoubtedly how the English government saw it. See MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE 311 (2008).
269. According to a leading dictionary of Jefferson’s time, the word “infidel” meant
“[a]n unbeliever; a miscreant; a pagan; one who rejects Christianity.” 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 537 (7th ed. abr., London, 1783).
270. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 894 n.3 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
271. Garry Abrams, Conversation with Joseph Cambell/On Mythology, L.A. TIMES,
May 27, 1987, at G1 (alteration in original) (quoting THE HERO’S JOURNEY: A
BIOGRAPHICAL PORTRAIT (Holoform Research Inc. 1987)).
272. JOHN DEWEY, A COMMON FAITH 51 (1934) (emphasis omitted).
273. “The God above the God of theism is present, although hidden, in every divinehuman encounter.” PAUL TILLICH, THE COURAGE TO BE 187 (2d ed. 2000).
274. Bruce Ledewitz, Toward a Meaning-Full Establishment Clause Neutrality, 87 CHI.KENT L. REV. 725, 751 (2012).
275. Id. at 752.
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Declaration of Independence. Despite its unmistakably religious
language, the document was carefully designed to be inclusive.
Thomas Jefferson wrote the first draft of the Declaration of
Independence and began with a religious reference that largely
remained in the final version:
When in the course of human events it becomes necessary for a
people to advance from that subordination in which they have
hitherto remained, & to assume among the powers of the earth
the equal & independent station to which the laws of nature & of
nature’s god entitle them . . . .276
The phrase “laws of nature and of nature’s god” is associated with
eighteenth century deism, a “rather vague Enlightenment-era belief . . .
in a Creator whose divine handiwork was evident in the wonders of
nature” but not “a personal God who interceded directly in the daily
affairs of mankind.”277
Jefferson’s original draft did not contain the iconic phrase “endowed
by their Creator.” Instead, he had written: “We hold these Truths to be
self evident; that all Men are created equal and independent; that from
that equal Creation they derive Rights inherent and inalienable . . . .”278
Jefferson’s draft was edited by the so-called Committee of Five, which
consisted of Jefferson, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Roger
Sherman, and Robert Livingston.279 The committee changed the
276. 1 Thomas Jefferson, Original Rough Draft of the Declaration of Independence, in 1
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 423, 423 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950) (emphasis added).
277. WALTER ISAACSON, AMERICAN SKETCHES: GREAT LEADERS, CREATIVE
THINKERS, AND HEROES OF A HURRICANE 29 (2009); see also STEVEN WALDMAN,
FOUNDING FAITH: PROVIDENCE, POLITICS, AND THE BIRTH OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN
AMERICA 88–89 (2008) (“This was the language of the Enlightenment theology that grew up
in the eighteenth century as a result not only of philosophical innovations—John Locke,
David Hume, and others—but also, more important, of scientific innovations.”). Whether
Jefferson himself was a “deist” is a matter of some dispute. Compare William D. Gould, The
Religious Opinions of Thomas Jefferson, 20 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 191, 199 (1933)
(“Jefferson was not a deist. . . . [H]e was a decided Unitarian.”), with 3 DUMAS MALONE,
JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME: JEFFERSON AND THE ORDEAL OF LIBERTY 481 (1962)
(“Actually, he was a deist, not an atheist.”).
278. Thomas Jefferson, First Draft of the Declaration of Independence, reprinted in
5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 491, 492 (1906) (emphasis added). The word
“inalienable” in Jefferson’s draft was changed to “unalienable” in the final draft, but it is
believed that this was of no great significance. See Stephen E. Lucas, Justifying America: The
Declaration of Independence as a Rhetorical Document, in AMERICAN RHETORIC: CONTEXT
AND CRITICISM 67, 124 n.50 (Thomas W. Benson ed., 1989). Some suspect that it might well
have been a printer’s error that was never authorized by Congress. Id.
279. Lucas, supra note 278, at 71–72.
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language on human rights into a form which is much closer to its final
version: “We hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
inherent & inalienable rights . . . .”280
The word “Creator” has been claimed by some partisans to support
a particular religious belief: “Clearly, the signers of the Declaration of
Independence believed that God must be acknowledged and ‘that all
men were created equal’ and ‘endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights’ . . . .”281 That view ignores the nuance of the
Framers’ language. In truth, this language “is highly ambiguous in its
theological groundings.”282 The word Creator simultaneously fit into a
wide range of religious beliefs. Deists, who viewed the concept of “God
as a first cause,”283 frequently referred to “God” as “the Creator.”284 Yet
the term was also utilized by the orthodox religions of the time:
Congregational Minister and Yale president Timothy Dwight delivered
a sermon stating that the Bible contained “as full a proof, that Christ is
the Creator, [and] . . . that the Creator is God.”285
280. Jefferson, supra note 278, at 492 (struck language omitted).
281. Roy S. Moore, Religion in the Public Square, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 347, 349 (1999)
(quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776)).
282. Daniel J. Morrissey, The Separation of Church and State: An American-Catholic
Perspective, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 43 (1997).
283. ERIC FONER, TOM PAINE AND REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 118 (updated ed.
2005).
284. ALF J. MAPP, JR., THE FAITHS OF OUR FATHERS: WHAT AMERICA’S FOUNDERS
REALLY BELIEVED 7 (paperback ed. 2005).
285. TIMOTHY DWIGHT, Sermon XXXIX: Divinity of Christ.—Objections Answered., in
2 THEOLOGY; EXPLAINED AND DEFENDED IN A SERIES OF SERMONS 5, 9 (New York, G. &
C. Carvill 5th ed. 1828). In its final edit, the Continental Congress added two further religious
references to the Declaration of Independence:
We, therefore, the Representatives of the United States of America, in General
Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the Rectitude
of our Intentions, do, . . . Declare, That these United Colonies are, and of Right
ought to be Free and Independent States . . . . And for the support of this
Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of divine Providence, we mutually
pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added). The phrases
added by Congress—“appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world” and “protection of
divine Providence”—are widely interpreted as being more traditionally religious than the
earlier two religious references. Historian Pauline Maier describes Congress as adding “two
references to God, which were conspicuously missing in Jefferson’s draft.” PAULINE MAIER,
AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 148–49 (1997).
Nonetheless, even after the congressional editing, the religious language in the final version of
the Declaration of Independence remains inclusive. According to historian Steven Waldman,
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As President, Washington followed the practice embodied in the
Declaration of Independence of offering public expressions of religion
that were devout but capable of being accepted by a wide, if not endless,
variety of belief systems. His Inaugural Address, for example, like his
subsequent Thanksgiving Address, was replete with explicitly religious
but carefully inclusive language.
Although Washington avoided using the word “God,” the Address
began with a direct religious “supplication”: “[I]t would be peculiarly
improper to omit in this first official Act, my fervent supplications to
that Almighty Being who rules over the Universe, who presides in the
Councils of Nations, and whose providential aids can supply every
human defect.”286 After this pious opening, he reminded his audience of
the role that he believed that divine intervention had played in their
victory over the British:
No People can be bound to acknowledge and adore the invisible
hand, which conducts the Affairs of men more than the People of
the United States. Every step, by which they have advanced to
the character of an independent nation, seems to have been
distinguished by some token of providential agency.287
At the close of the Address, Washington returned to his religious
theme:
I shall take my present leave; but not without resorting once
more to the benign Parent of the human race, in humble
supplication that . . . this divine blessing may be equally
conspicuous in the enlarged views—the temperate consultations,
and the wise measures on which the success of this Government
must depend.288
To appreciate the care with which the Inaugural Address was
crafted, one can compare the final product with the first draft that had

“the term Divine Providence was one the Deists could accept, because it left the door open
for God to work either directly and personally or through the laws of nature.” WALDMAN,
supra note 277, at 89. The phrases are not specifically Protestant or Christian; perhaps, as one
commentator has asserted, they “unambiguously derive from Judaism.” MICHAEL NOVAK,
ON TWO WINGS: HUMBLE FAITH AND COMMON SENSE AT THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 17
(2002).
286. George Washington, First Inaugural Address (April 30, 1789), in 2 THE PAPERS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 152, 173–74 (Dorothy Twohig ed., 1987).
287. Id.
288. Id. at 176–77 (emphasis omitted).
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been prepared by Washington’s secretary David Humphreys.289
Humphreys had wanted Washington to use explicitly Christian language
referencing “[t]he blessed Religion revealed in the word of God.”290
Although the final Address contains much religious imagery, it
includes nothing that is uniquely Christian. Additionally, Humphreys’s
draft of Washington’s remarks “included a short space for a prayer that
was to be introduced after the first paragraph.”291 On the day of the
inauguration, prayers were indeed given, but they were not led by the
President. Instead, they were conducted by Senate chaplain Samuel
Provoost during “divine services,” held at Saint Paul’s Church, after the
Inaugural Address.292
Washington’s Farewell Address was written with the same sort of
inclusive religious language as the Inaugural Address. The final version
of the Farewell Address was primarily drafted by Alexander Hamilton,
with Washington providing some crucial editorial changes.293 A
289. Washington asked James Madison to review Humphreys’s seventy-three page
draft. Letter from George Washington to James Madison (Feb. 16, 1789), in 11 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON 446, 446 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 1977). Madison
expressed his disdain for the work, which he later described as “so strange a production,”
Correspondence with James Madison, in 2 THE LIFE & WRITINGS OF JARED SPARKS 208,
212–13 (Herbert B. Adams ed., Boston, Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1893), and proceeded to
draft a completely new speech, Washington, supra note 286, at 153–54.
290. Washington, supra note 286, at 166. Jared Sparks, the original editor of The
Writings of George Washington, had destroyed the version of Humphreys’s draft that
Washington had hand copied. Sparks cut the seventy-three pages into small pieces and gave
them to people who wanted something with Washington’s handwriting. See id. at 152–53.
The twentieth century editors of The Papers of George Washington were able to reassemble
small portions of the original, one of which read: “The blessed Religion revealed in the word
of God will remain an eternal and awful monument to prove that the best Institutions may be
abused by human depravity; and that they may even, in some instances be made subservient
to the vilest of purposes.” Id. at 166.
291. Correspondence with James Madison, supra note 289, at 211.
292. Washington, supra note 286, at 154–55.
293. When Washington had considered stepping down in 1792, at the close of his first
term, he asked Madison to write a draft of a “valedictory.” FELIX GILBERT, TO THE
FAREWELL ADDRESS: IDEAS OF EARLY AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 124–25 (1961). Four
years later, having become alienated from both Madison and Jefferson due to bitter political
differences over issues such as the National Bank and Jay’s Treaty, Washington asked
Hamilton for help revising Madison’s draft. On May 15, 1796, Washington sent Hamilton a
copy of Madison’s draft, as well as a note describing some of the points he wanted to add.
Letter from George Washington to Alexander Hamilton (May 15, 1796), in 20 PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 174, 175 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1974) [hereinafter 20 PAH].
Hamilton rewrote the Address and, on July 30, sent his new draft to Washington. Letter from
Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (July 30, 1796), in 20 PAH, supra at 264, 264–65.
Hamilton kept much of Madison’s introductory language and conclusion but added an
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comparison between Hamilton’s language and that finally used by
Washington demonstrates Washington’s insistence on using inclusive
public religious language. With minimal stylistic modifications from
Hamilton’s version, Washington wrote, “[L]et us with caution indulge
the supposition that morality can be maintained without religion.
Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on
minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to
expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious
principle.”294
In Hamilton’s draft, however, the statement foreshadowing the end
of “national morality” without religion, was followed by a rhetorical
question: “Does it not require the aid of a generally received and
divinely authoritative Religion?”295 Washington deleted this entirely,
thereby removing Hamilton’s attempt to add the explicitly Christian
allusion to “received . . . religion.”296
Throughout his presidency, Washington was determined that
religious differences would not disrupt the new nation. As writers
Michael and Jana Novak noted, his goal was to find a way of
communicating that “unites—rather than divides—a religiously
pluralistic people.”297
D. The Religious Language of Jefferson and Madison
Despite the widespread view that Thomas Jefferson called for a
“total separation” between religion and government,298 throughout his
presidency he consciously employed religious language in a comparable
manner to Washington. He ended his first inaugural address, on March
4, 1801, with a non-denominational religious plea similar in tone to that
spoken by Washington: “[M]ay that Infinite Power which rules the

extensive middle section discussing many of the contemporary political issues, such as the
desirability of maintaining neutrality during the conflict between England and France. See id.
at 265–88.
294. WASHINGTON’S FAREWELL ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES,
S. DOC. NO. 106-21, at 20 (2000).
295. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, supra note 293, at 280.
296. Id. at 280 & n.22.
297. MICHAEL NOVAK & JANA NOVAK, WASHINGTON’S GOD: RELIGION, LIBERTY,
AND THE FATHER OF OUR COUNTRY 14 (2006).
298. Robert L. Cord & Howard Ball, The Separation of Church and State: A Debate,
1987 UTAH L. REV. 895, 913 (quoting FAWN M. BRODIE, THOMAS JEFFERSON: AN
INTIMATE HISTORY 129 (1974)).
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destinies of the universe, lead our councils to what is best, and give them
a favorable issue for your peace and prosperity.”299
Throughout his presidency, Jefferson would utilize similar religious
language in his speeches. In his second message to Congress, Jefferson
declared that “our just attentions are first drawn to those pleasing
circumstances which mark the goodness of that Being from whose favor
they flow, and the large measure of thankfulness we owe for his
bounty.”300 In his 1805 message to Congress, he noted there had been
an outbreak of yellow fever but that “Providence in his goodness gave it
an early termination on this occasion, and lessened the number of
victims which have usually fallen before it.”301
The major difference between the public religious language of
Washington and Jefferson was that Jefferson refused to issue a
Thanksgiving proclamation. While Jefferson would employ nonsectarian religious language himself, he opposed government officials
even recommending that citizens engage in religious activity. Such a
recommendation by a president, he believed, carried an implicit threat.
At minimum, he said, it would lead to “some degree of proscription,
perhaps in public opinion.”302 Because “[f]asting & prayer are religious
exercises” and “[e]very religious society has a right to determine for
itself the times for these exercises, and the objects proper for them,” the
right to call for days of thanksgiving, fasting, and prayer “can never be
safer than in their own hands, where the constitution has deposited
it.”303
When James Madison became President, he too utilized inclusive,
non-sectarian religious language. For example, he concluded his First
Inaugural Address in 1809 with a devout entreaty to
the guardianship and guidance of that Almighty Being whose
power regulates the destiny of nations, whose blessings have

299. Thomas Jefferson, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 1, 5 (H.A. Washington ed., New York, Riker, Thorne & Co. 1854)
[hereinafter 8 WTJ].
300. Thomas Jefferson, Second Annual Message (Dec. 15, 1802), in 8 WTJ, supra note
299, at 15, 15.
301. Thomas Jefferson, Fifth Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1805), in 8 WTJ, supra note 299,
at 46, 46.
302. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Rev. Mr. Millar (Jan. 23, 1808), in 4 MEMOIRS,
CORRESPONDENCE AND PRIVATE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 106, 106 (Thomas
Jefferson Randolph ed., London, Henry Colburn & Richard Bentley 1829).
303. Id. at 106–07.
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been so conspicuously dispensed to this rising Republic, and to
whom we are bound to address our devout gratitude for the past,
as well as our fervent supplications and best hopes for the
future.304
Earlier in the Address, Madison had announced as one of his guiding
principles his commitment “to avoid the slightest interference with the
rights of conscience, or the functions of religion so wisely exempted
from civil jurisdiction.”305 Like Jefferson, Madison did not see the use of
religious language in official speeches as violating the principle of
separation of Church and State. To both Jefferson and Madison, fidelity
to that principle did not require the purging of all religious language
from public dialogue.
Unlike Jefferson, Madison issued several recommendations that the
public engage in days of thanksgivings and fasts, though later in life
Madison expressed his strong objections to such presidential
recommendations. As President, Madison felt compelled to issue his
proclamations by the necessity of building public support for the War of
1812. This was an unpopular war; the vote for the official declaration of
war, 79–49 in the House of Representatives and 19–13 “in the Senate—
was the closest vote on any declaration of war in American history.”306
Less than a month after the war began, Madison, “in response to a
specific request by both houses of Congress, . . . issued the first of his
four religious proclamations.”307 His July 9 proclamation was a call for
“a day of public Humiliation and Prayer.”308 Among the activities
Madison recommended were “rendering to the Sovereign of the
Universe, and the Benefactor of mankind, the public homage due to his
holy attributes” and “acknowledging the transgressions which might
justly provoke the manifestations of His divine displeasure.”309

304. James Madison, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1809) [hereinafter Madison, First
Inaugural], in 1 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 15, 17–18 (Robert
A. Rutland & Thomas A. Mason eds., 1984). Interestingly, he did not use any religious
imagery in his Second Inaugural. See James Madison, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4,
1813), in 6 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 85 (Angela Kreider ed.,
2008) [hereinafter 6 PJM].
305. Madison, First Inaugural, supra note 304, at 17.
306. DONALD R. HICKEY, THE WAR OF 1812: A SHORT HISTORY 16 (1995).
307. MEYERSON, supra note 59, at 222.
308. James Madison, Presidential Proclamation (July 9, 1812), in 4 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 581, 581 (J.C.A. Stagg ed., 1999).
309. Id. at 581.
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After he left office, Madison explained to a friend that when he
issued a religious proclamation he was “always careful to make the
Proclamations absolutely indiscriminate, and merely recommendatory;
or rather mere designations of a day, on which all who thought proper
might unite in consecrating it to religious purposes, according to their
own faith & forms.”310 Accordingly, in his first proclamation, Madison
stated his hope that his “recommendation” would “enable the several
religious denominations and societies so disposed, to offer, at one and
the same time, their common vows and adorations to Almighty God.”311
Madison was more explicit in his second proclamation one year
later. He began by “recommending to all, who shall be piously disposed
to unite . . . in addressing, at one and the same time, their vows and
adorations, to the great Parent and Sovereign of the Universe,” who,
Madison said, had blessed the United States with the “sacred rights of
conscience.”312 Even with such a commitment to “freewill offerings,”
Madison never accepted that such proclamations, including his own,
were appropriate.
In his so-called “Detatched Memoranda,” a
collection of private papers written sometime after he left office in
1817,313 Madison explained his opposition to religious proclamations,
which, he said, “imply a religious agency, making no part of the trust
delegated to political rulers.”314 According to Madison, calling these
proclamations “advisory” did not ameliorate the problem since “[a]n
advisory Govt is a contradiction in terms.”315 Madison warned that

310. Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), supra note 76,
at 101 (emphasis omitted).
311. Madison, supra note 308, at 581 (emphasis added).
312. James Madison, A Proclamation (July 23, 1813), in 6 PJM, supra note 304, at 458,
458–59. His last two religious proclamations had similar, though less eloquent, disclaimers.
His 1814 proclamation recommended that a day be set aside “on which all may have an
opportunity of voluntarily offering at the same time in their respective religious assemblies
their humble adoration to the Great Sovereign of the Universe.” James Madison,
Presidential Proclamation (Nov. 16, 1814), in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 543, 543 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897). His final
proclamation recommended that the people “of every religious denomination may in their
solemn assemblies unite their hearts and their voices in a freewill offering to their Heavenly
Benefactor of their homage of thanksgiving and of their songs of praise.” James Madison,
A Proclamation (Mar. 4, 1815), in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF
THE PRESIDENTS, supra, at 545, 546.
313. Madison, Detatched Memoranda, supra note 77.
314. Id. at 560.
315. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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these proclamations “nourish the erron[e]ous idea of a national
religion.”316
E. The Failed Sectarian President
Of the four presidents from the founding generation, only John
Adams used sectarian religious language in his public addresses. In his
inaugural address, Adams described himself as having “a veneration for
the religion of a people who profess and call themselves Christians, and
a fixed resolution to consider a decent respect for Christianity among
the best recommendations for the public service.”317 Thus, not only did
Adams announce his own personal “veneration” for Christianity, he
pledged to use a religious litmus test for governmental hiring in
violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of the constitutional ban on
religious tests.318
When Adams issued his two proclamations calling for days of
“humiliation, fasting, and prayer,” he also employed sectarian, noninclusive language, drafted by the chaplains of Congress, the Reverends
Bishop White and Ashbel Green.319 The first of these proclamations,
issued March 23, 1798, was substantially “more overtly Christian than
Washington’s.”320 Unlike Washington, who stated that it was “the duty
of all Nations” to acknowledge God,321 Adams decreed that
acknowledging God was each individual’s duty, declaring that it was “an
indispensable duty, which the people owe to him.”322 Also differing
from Washington, Adams employed explicitly Christian language in his
recommendation that all citizens “offer their devout addresses to the
Father of Mercies . . . , beseeching him at the same time, of his infinite

316. Madison spelled the word “erronious.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
317. John Adams, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1797), in 1 THE ADDRESSES AND
MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: INAUGURAL, ANNUAL, AND
SPECIAL, FROM 1789–1846, at 103, 106 (Edwin Williams ed., New York, Edward Walker
1846).
318. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (stating that “no religious Test shall ever be required as a
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States”).
319. ASHBEL GREEN, THE LIFE OF ASHBEL GREEN, V.D.M. 270–71 (Joseph H. Hones
ed., New York, Robert Carter & Bros. 1849).
320. 2 JAMES HITCHCOCK, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION IN AMERICAN LIFE
30 (2004).
321. Washington, supra note 259, at 131.
322. John Adams, Official Proclamation for a National Fast (Mar. 23, 1798), in 9 THE
WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 169, 169 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Boston, Little Brown & Co.
1854).
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grace, through the Redeemer of the world, freely to remit all our
offences, and to incline us, by his Holy Spirit.”323
According to Ashbel Green, even this language was not enough to
prevent the complaint that “the religious community of our country had
made, namely, that the proclamation . . . lacked a decidedly Christian
spirit.”324 Accordingly, Green said, when Adams requested a second
proclamation a year later, “I resolved to write one of an evangelical
character.”325 The 1799 proclamation begins with a reference to the
lessons of the “Volume of Inspiration” and calls for the citizens of the
nation to
call to mind our numerous offenses against the Most High God,
confess them before Him with the sincerest penitence, implore
His pardoning mercy, through the Great Mediator and
Redeemer, for our past transgressions, and that through the
grace of His Holy Spirit we may be disposed and enabled to yield
a more suitable obedience to His righteous requisitions in time to
come.326
This time, the “religious community” was enthusiastic in praise.
John Mitchell Mason, a Presbyterian minister, applauded Adams for
displaying support, “in one of his proclamations, to a number of the
most precious truths of Revelation.”327 Adams’s political opponents,
however, saw these overt religious declarations as fundamentally
illegitimate; many religious groups viewed them as “Federalist plots to
ensnare Republicans into praying for John Adams.”328
After losing his bid for re-election to Jefferson, Adams blamed his
loss on his religious proclamations: “The National Fast, recommended
by me turned me out of office.”329 According to Adams, the fear that he
323.
324.
325.
326.

Id. at 169–70.
GREEN, supra note 319, at 270.
Id.
John Adams, Proclamation (Mar. 6, 1799), in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 284, 284–85 (James D. Richardson ed.,
Washington, Gov’t Printing Office 1896).
327. JOHN MITCHELL MASON, THE VOICE OF WARNING TO CHRISTIANS (New York,
n.p. 1800), reprinted in POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA, 1730–
1805, at 1447, 1469 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1991).
328. Perry Miller, From the Covenant to the Revival, in 1 RELIGION IN AMERICAN LIFE:
THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN RELIGION 322, 357 (James Ward Smith & A. Leland Jamison
eds., 1961).
329. Letter from John Adams to Benjamin Rush (June 12, 1812), in OLD FAMILY
LETTERS 391, 392 (Alexander Biddle ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co. 1892).
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was supporting the Presbyterian Church as it “aimed at an
Establishment as a National Church” both “allarmed and alienated
Quakers, Anabaptists, Mennonists, Moravians, Swedenborgians,
Methodists, Catholicks, protestant Episcopalians, Arians, Socinians,
Armenians, &c, &c, &c, Atheists and Deists might be added.”330 The
strong desire to avoid a sectarian President, Adams said, “is at the
bottom of the unpopularity of national Fasts and Thanksgiving.”331 The
lesson that Adams drew was clear: “Nothing is more dreaded than the
National Government meddling with Religion.”332
V. LEARNING FROM THE FRAMERS
A. Speaking to All Americans
The framing generation did not construct a philosophy of the proper
relationship between religion and government in a simplistic way. The
intellectual compromise of the framing generation reflects a
sophisticated balance.
They believed that genuine, devout
governmental religious speech was to be permitted. But unlike the
unrestricted religious speech of the citizenry, the religious speech of the
government was to be strictly limited. The critically important aspect of
the framing generation’s compromise was that only the most general,
non-sectarian reference to God was deemed appropriate.
The Framers understood from history that religious oppression does
not come from a simple belief in God; it arises when a sectarian view of
God finds its voice and power in an institution or group that deems itself
the sole interpreter of divine will. Accordingly, the Framers decided
that the American government should not acknowledge religion in a
way that favored any particular creed, denomination, or group of
denominations. They were not afraid of a public offering containing
truly religious expression. Yet they strove to find a civil vocabulary that
could encompass all people, regardless of their faith.
This understanding of the Framers’ view of religious freedom reveals
the flaws in Justice Scalia’s defense of the posting of copies of the Ten
Commandments inside Kentucky courthouses. According to Justice

330. Id.
331. Id. at 393. According to Adams, all of the different groups he named believed,
“Let us have Jefferson, Madison, Burr, any body, whether they be Philosophers, Deists, or
even Atheists, rather than a Presbyterian President.” Id. at 392–93.
332. Id. at 393.
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Scalia, “Publicly honoring the Ten Commandments is . . .
indistinguishable, insofar as discriminating against other religions is
concerned, from publicly honoring God.”333 Justice Scalia based his
conclusion on the fact that “[t]he three most popular religions in the
United States, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam—which combined
account for 97.7% of all believers—are monotheistic. All of them,
moreover (Islam included), believe that the Ten Commandments were
given by God to Moses, and are divine prescriptions for a virtuous
life.”334
Justice Scalia concluded that since honoring both the Ten
Commandments and God “are recognized across such a broad and
diverse range of the population—from Christians to Muslims—that they
cannot be reasonably understood as a government endorsement of a
particular religious viewpoint.”335
There are numerous problems with this analysis, starting from his
apparent assumption that “97.7% of all believers . . . believe that the
Ten Commandments were given by God to Moses, and are divine
prescriptions for a virtuous life.”336 First, Justice Scalia’s equating of the
number of Christians, Jews, and Muslims with the number of people
who believe in the divinity of the Ten Commandments presumes the
untenable conclusion that every person who is a member of a religion
believes in all of its tenets.337 Second, using as his statistical base the
number of “all believers,” rather than “all citizens,” deliberately ignores
the sensibilities and interests of a sizable portion of the population.338
Most important, perhaps, is that Justice Scalia’s arithmetic analysis
was rejected by the Framers, in particular George Washington. During
Washington’s presidency, the percentage of Protestants in the country

333. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 894 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
334. Id. (citation omitted) (citing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES: 2004–2005, at 55 tbl.67 (2004)).
335. Id.
336. Id.; see MEYERSON, supra note 59, at 270.
337. For example, 45% of U.S. Catholics supported legalized abortion in a 2009 survey.
See Support for Abortion Slips: Issue Ranks Lower on the Agenda, PEW RESEARCH CTR.
(Oct. 1, 2009), http://people-press.org/report/549/support-for-abortion-slips, archived at http://
perma.cc/EM48-XV85.
338. It also ignores “Hindus and Buddhists, rapidly growing segments of American
society, [who] are very upset about some displays that denigrate them.” NUSSBAUM, supra
note 268, at 269. Nussbaum also points out that “[e]ven Muslims, Jews, and Roman Catholics,
moreover, would not approve of the Protestant version of the commandments, which is the one
in question here.” Id. (emphasis added).
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was as high, if not higher, than the 97.7% figure for Christians, Jews, and
Muslims relied on by Justice Scalia. According to one estimate, as of
1776, Protestants made up 98.1% of all congregations in the nation, with
Catholics at 1.7% and Jews at .2%.339 If Washington had followed
Justice Scalia’s logic, he would have utilized strictly Protestant language
in his proclamations; to be safe he could have used Christian
terminology to be in keeping with the beliefs of 99.8% of the
populations. Of course, Washington did not. He deliberately chose
non-denominational language.340 His goal was that the “National
Government, which by the favor of Divine Providence, was formed by
the common Counsels, and peaceably established with the common
consent of the People, will prove a blessing to every denomination of
them.”341
Unlike Justice Scalia, Washington was not content to use
denominational speech merely because it was “recognized across . . . a
broad and diverse range of the population.”342 Washington’s vision for
the nation was far more inclusive: “The bosom of America is open to
receive,” he wrote, “the oppressed and persecuted of all nations and
religions; whom we shall welcome to a participation of all our rights and
privileges, if by decency and propriety of conduct, they appear to merit
the enjoyment.”343
B. Establishing the Framers’ Compromise
The Framers, however, did not believe that this universal welcome
required the avoidance of all public religious language. Their use of
theologically equivocal language was a deliberate attempt to create a
pious public vocabulary that could be shared, albeit in different ways, by
those possessing the full range of religious beliefs. Those from orthodox
religions could see this public language not simply as consistent with
their own language of worship but actually as part of it. The Framers’
339. Rodney Stark & Roger Finke, American Religion in 1776: A Statistical Portrait, 49
SOC. ANALYSIS 39, 49 tbl.5 (1988).
340. NOVAK & NOVAK, supra note 297, at 14; see notes 286–96 and accompanying text.
341. Letter from George Washington to the Soc’y of Quakers (Oct. 1789), in 4 PGW,
supra note 259, at 265, 265–66 (emphasis added).
342. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 894 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
343. Letter from George Washington to the Members of the Volunteer Ass’n, and
Other Inhabitants of the Kingdom of Ir., Who Have Lately Arrived in the City of N.Y. (Dec.
2, 1783), quoted in JOHN B. DILLON, NOTES ON HISTORICAL EVIDENCE IN REFERENCE TO
ADVERSE THEORIES OF THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 74 (New York, S.W. Green 1871) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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religious language, though, was capacious enough to permit those
outside the mainstream of the nation’s predominant religious belief
systems to join in the experience of a conscientious communion with the
rest of their nation. This language was designed to communicate to all,
including the deistic, agnostic, and atheistic, that they were each valued
members of the political community.
To take the lessons from the Framers’ practices and create a modern
test for evaluating the constitutionality of governmental religious speech
requires a subtle but significant modification of the endorsement test.
That test is premised on the principle that “[e]ndorsement sends a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of
the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents
that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.”344
The framing generation shared the concern that all citizens,
regardless of their religious beliefs, must be treated and valued as “full
members of the political community.”345 But the Framers would not
have agreed that every endorsement of religion communicated secondclass citizenship to non-adherents. Carefully chosen, theologically
equivocal phraseology can be seen as respecting all members of our
pluralistic nation because the words are designed to be capable of
multiple meanings.346 The inclusive, non-denominational religious
language of Washington’s Thanksgiving Proclamation, Jefferson’s
Statute for Religious Freedom, and Madison’s Inaugural Address was
not considered divisive or insulting. A workable test reflecting the
Framers’ wisdom, then, would only view as unconstitutional
governmental speech or practices that endorsed religion in such a way
that it “sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community.”347
344. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Conner, J., concurring).
345. Id.; MEYERSON, supra note 59, at 272.
346. See, e.g., Ledewitz, supra note 274, at 753 (“[L]ike the Sunday closing laws,
religious imagery can retain its religious meaning for the believer and still be constitutional, as
long as it also contains a secular component. In other words, if the government can plausibly
maintain a secular meaning for a word like God, there should not be a violation of neutrality
because religious believers understand the word God differently, just as the religious desire
for Sunday closing laws did not remove a parallel secular justification.”).
347. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Conner, J., concurring). Mike Schaps, in trying to make
sense out of the disparate opinions in the two Ten Commandment cases, created a summary
similar to my proposed standard: “One may sketch the standard as follows: Government
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While determining which endorsements of religion communicate
such inappropriate messages will not always be simple, the path created
by the Framers can provide some important guidelines. Sectarian
governmental language, such as Kentucky’s posting of the Ten
Commandments in the courthouse, would generally violate that
standard. Many common forms of governmental religious speech, those
that rely on general, non-sectarian references to God, would pass this
test.
The phrase “one Nation under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance and
the national motto, “In God We Trust,” for example, would be entirely
permissible. Properly viewed, those phrases are not “a profession of a
religious belief, namely, a belief in monotheism.”348 Rather, they are
perfectly consistent with the inclusive, non-sectarian language of the
Framers. They are functionally the same as Thomas Jefferson’s Statute
for Religious Freedom that began with the phrase “Whereas Almighty
God hath created the mind free.”349
The invocation that precedes sessions of the Supreme Court, “God
save the United States and this Honorable Court,” also is not
problematic.
It should not be considered “the government’s
endorsement of a transcendent, monotheistic, Judeo-Christian God.”350
Instead, it would be treated as consistent with the non-sectarian
language of Washington, Jefferson, and Madison. By contrast, it would
be unconstitutional for a court to begin its sessions, as one did in North
Carolina, with the judge saying,
Let us pause for a moment of prayer . . . . O Lord, our God, our
Father in Heaven, we pray this morning that you will place your
divine guiding hand on this courtroom . . . . Let truth be heard

cannot favor one religion over another, or act to benefit religion over nonreligion, unless a
government practice promotes nonsectarian religion only slightly and is so deeply woven into
our national traditions that enjoining it would be highly divisive.” Mike Schaps, Comment,
Vagueness as a Virtue: Why the Supreme Court Decided the Ten Commandments Cases
Inexactly Right, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1243, 1244 (2006) (emphasis omitted).
348. Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 487 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Elk Grove
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 5 (2004).
349. An Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, ch. 34 (1786), in 12 THE STATUTES AT
LARGE BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA FROM THE FIRST SESSION
OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THE YEAR 1619, at 84 (William Waller Hening ed., Richmond,
George Cochran 1823) (capitalization omitted). See also George Washington’s Thanksgiving
Day Proclamation, asserting the nation’s duty “to acknowledge the providence of Almighty
God.” Washington, supra note 259, at 131.
350. Epstein, supra note 19, at 2144.
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and wisdom be reflected in the light of your presence with us
here today. Amen.351
The relevant difference between the two judicial statements can be seen
in George Washington’s refusal to follow the Continental Congress’s
practice of declaring it the “the indispensable duty of all men to adore
the superintending providence of Almighty God.”352 Rather than
directing the citizenry to pray, Washington stated it was “the duty of all
Nations to acknowledge the providence of Almighty God.”353 In the
same spirit, Madison declared, “It is the duty of every man to render to
the Creator such homage and such only as he believes to be acceptable
to him.”354 The Establishment Clause should reject any “exhortation
from government to the people that they engage in religious conduct.”355
Similarly, the practice of legislative prayer that was upheld by the
Supreme Court in Marsh should be limited to situations where the
prayer is “directed at the legislators themselves.”356 By contrast, it
should be unconstitutional for a city council, attended by citizens with
business before the council, to open with a prayer that “urge[s] citizens
to engage in religious practices.”357
The Framers will not always be a sufficient guide for applying the
proposed standard. We know that the Framers studiously avoided
sectarian governmental speech, but we cannot know precisely what they
would have done with sectarian governmental displays that had been in
place for a substantial time. Nonetheless, such sectarian displays that
post-date the founding period but are of long-standing lineage, such as
the forty-year-old Ten Commandments display that was upheld in Van
351. N.C. Civil Liberties Union Legal Found. v. Constangy, 947 F.2d 1145, 1147 (4th
Cir. 1991).
352. Adams, supra note 255, at 854.
353. Washington, supra note 259, at 131.
354. Madison, supra note 237, at 299.
355. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 603 n.52 (1989), abrogated by Town of
Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
356. N.C. Civil Liberties Union, 947 F.2d at 1149.
357. Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 603 n.52. The Court in Town of Greece v.
Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014), held that prayer before a city council did not violate the
Establishment Clause. 134 S. Ct. at 1813. Justice Alito, in his concurrence, pointed out that
the prayer at issue in the case occurred prior to “the ‘legislative’ portion of its agenda, during
which residents were permitted to address the board. After this portion of the meeting, a
separate stage of the meetings was devoted to such matters as formal requests for variances.”
Id. at 1829 (Alito, J., concurring). Accordingly, he stated, “I do not understand this case to
involve the constitutionality of a prayer prior to what may be characterized as an adjudicatory
proceeding.” Id.
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Orden or the treatment of Christmas as a national holiday,358 should not
be considered violative of the Establishment Clause. Despite their
secular nature, the longevity of such sectarian displays will blunt the
hostile message to non-adherents that the displays would have conveyed
when originally created.359
VI. CONCLUSION
When the Establishment Clause was included in the First
Amendment, it was seen as ensuring, in the words of James Madison,
“the practical distinction between Religion & Civil Gov[ernmen]t”
which was “essential to the purity of both.”360 Those who fought for the
Establishment Clause considered the prevention of religious
establishments to be an essential part of religious freedom. The
Reverend William Tennent, a South Carolina Presbyterian minister,
who fought to disestablish the state’s Anglican Church, argued that the
simple designation of a denomination as the “established church . . .
operates as an abridgment of religious liberty.”361 Even if they are free
to practice their own faith, Tennent argued, non-adherents “must at
least submit to this inferiority, or rather bear the reproach of the law as
not being on a level with those that are Christians in its esteem.”362
358. 5 U.S.C. § 6103 (2012). Christmas was first declared a national holiday in 1870.
Act of June 28, 1870, ch. 167, 16 Stat. 168.
359. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 701 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment) (stating that “the monument’s 40-year history on the Texas state grounds
indicates” that the state intended “the latter, nonreligious aspects of the tablets’ message to
predominate”); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 38 (2004) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he ‘history and ubiquity’ of a practice is relevant because it
provides part of the context in which a reasonable observer evaluates whether a challenged
governmental practice conveys a message of endorsement of religion.” (quoting Cnty. of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 630 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment))).
360. Letter from James Madison to Jesse Jones and Others (June 3, 1811), in 3 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 323, 323 (J.C.A. Stagg ed., 1996). This
letter was written by Madison, explaining his veto of a law that would have transferred
federal land to the Baptist Church, in violation of Madison’s understanding of the
Establishment Clause. See 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 1097–98 (1811).
361. William Tennent, Speech on the Dissenting Petition (Jan. 11, 1777), reprinted in
Newton B. Jones, Writings of the Reverend William Tennent, 1740–1777 (pt. 2), 61 S.C. HIST.
MAG. 189, 196, 202 (1960).
362. Id. at 202. Tennent was not prepared, however, to show the same solicitude to
Catholics and other non-Protestants. He approved of the eventual state establishment of
“[t]he Christian Protestant religion” because “not one sect of Christians in preference to all
others, but Christianity itself is the established religion of the state.” S.C. CONST. of 1778,
art. 38, in THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 137, 144 (Thomas Cooper ed.,
Columbia, A.S. Johnston 1836); Tennent, supra note 361, at 203.
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Accordingly, the Framers decided that the American government
should not acknowledge religion in a way that favored any particular
creed, denomination, or group of denominations. But they did not
believe that all religious governmental speech was inconsistent with that
goal. Some commentators have dismissed the use of public religious
language by Jefferson and Madison as instances where they simply
“diverged from principle” or where, as Justice David Souter succinctly
stated, “Homer nodded.”363 In reality, they, like George Washington,
consciously refused to eliminate religious expression from their public
speeches.
All three realized that they needed to find terminology that
permitted them to express reverential concepts without implying that
those not of a favored faith were second-class citizens. They strove to
avoid any action that, in the words of Madison’s Memorial and
Remonstrance, “degrades from the equal rank of Citizens all those
whose opinions in Religion do not bend to those of the Legislative
authority.”364
Thus, they did use genuine, devout governmental religious speech,
but only with the most general, non-sectarian references to God. Their
use of theologically equivocal language permitted them to communicate
with a diverse nation, encompassing all people, regardless of their faith.
Some contemporary atheists and other nonbelievers might object to
any governmental religious language, especially in light of the
exclusionary use of so much modern public religious speech. The
Framers, however, did not consider people with such beliefs to be
second-class citizens. Not only was their individual liberty of conscience
to be safeguarded, the federal Constitution’s prohibition of religious test
oaths guaranteed that they were to be considered full members of the
American body politic.
Moreover, the restricted nature of the
Government’s religious vocabulary was broad enough, in Jefferson’s
words, “to comprehend . . . the Jew and the Gentile, the Christian and
Mahometan, the Hindoo, and infidel of every denomination.”365
Some people have questioned whether the practices and attitudes
from the framing generation are truly “suited for the more religiously

363. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 624 n.5 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring), corrected by
Erratum, 535 U.S. II (2003).
364. Madison, supra note 237, at 302.
365. JEFFERSON, supra note 264, at 62.

1102

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[98:1035

pluralistic twenty-first century.”366 The American religious landscape is
certainly far different from what it was two centuries ago. A 2008
survey revealed that “the United States is on the verge of becoming a
minority Protestant country.”367 Protestants make up barely 51% of the
American population.368 In a development that would have shocked the
Framers, Catholics are the largest single American denomination,
representing almost 24% of the nation.369 American religious pluralism
now includes Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, Muslims, Buddhists,
Hindu, and many others, including the unaffiliated, atheists, and
agnostics.370
But it does not follow that because the “religious composition and
habits of contemporary America are so radically different from those at
the time of the founding that using the founding as a baseline is a non
sequitur.”371 It is precisely because we are a pluralistic nation that the
Framers’ understanding of religious liberty is so valuable. Their
example teaches us the importance of respecting religious differences.
They showed that it is possible to protect individual freedom of
conscience while utilizing inclusive public religious expression. The
framing generation also reminds us that, especially during times of
distrust and antagonism, respect for our fellow citizens’ personal
religious beliefs is a fundamental American value.
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